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The Application of Fundamental Rights to Private Relations in Kenya: A 
Case of Unintended Consequences, or Not? 
 
‘…It is highly desirable and in fact necessary to infuse the law of contracts with constitutional 
values…’–Moseneke DCJ1 
I Introduction 
Fundamental rights and freedoms were originally regarded as protections 
necessarily accorded to individuals against abuse of state power and thus were framed 
as applicable between the state and its citizens ie, in a vertical relationship as opposed 
to a horizontal relationship.2This was mainly because the relationship between the state 
and the individual was not one of equality as the state was far more powerful than the 
individual. Further, the fact that the state had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
within its territory meant that an individual would be in an extremely vulnerable position if 
he or she was not protected by a bill of rights against abuse of the state’s power.3 
Over time however, fundamental rights have evolved to include an obligation on 
individuals and private entities to uphold them in recognition of the fact that rights 
abuses can also be caused by private actors.4 Private individuals and enterprises have 
even been said to infringe fundamental rights more often and to a greater extent than 
                                                          
1Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Limited v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited [2011] ZACC 30 para 71. 
2J Fedtke ‘Drittwirkung in Germany’ in Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study’ 126. See 
also Cheadle, Davis & Haysom in South African Constitutional Law: the Bill of Rights where they state that the 
primary function of a constitution is to restrain the state in respect of the kind of laws it passes and the manner in 
which it conducts itself (3-2).  See also JH Knox’s article titled ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ available at http:// 
www.asil.org/pdfs/ajil_horizontal_ human _rights_law.  pdf  where he observes that the drafters of the initial 
human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human rights were aware of the possibility of 
human rights applying horizontally but chose to adopt an approach that relegated private duties to the margins 
because they saw the danger of governments relying on such duties to limit human rights in unpredictable and 
unacceptable ways.  
3Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 43. 
4D Chirwa ‘The Horizontal Application of Constitutional Rights in a Comparative Perspective’ available at http:// 
www.saflii.org/za/journals/LDD/2006/9.pdfwhere he demonstrates a growing trend towards an increasing 












public authorities.5 It is therefore not surprising that very few jurisdictions still adopt a 
purely vertical approach.6 
Ordinarily, the extent to which the courts of a country will enforce fundamental 
rights against individuals and private entities will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
often depending upon legal culture, constitutional tradition and conceptions of 
fundamental rights.7 A key factor is the status of norms contained in the constitutional 
system. If these norms are envisaged as primarily concerned with controlling the 
functions of public bodies then there may be some reluctance to apply fundamental 
rights in the private sphere. However, if constitutional norms are seen as fundamental 
legal principles that should permeate all law whether public or private, and which all 
legal actors should respect, then there may be much greater willingness to apply these 
norms in private law.8 
In Kenya, the application of the fundamental rights in the private sphere remains 
a highly controversial and unresolved issue. As this study will demonstrate, there are no 
easy answers, rather, ample scope for confusion and therefore, uncertainty as the 
jurisprudence develops. 
Consider for instance, two recent decisions by the High Court of the Republic of 
Kenya (“the High Court’) that dealt with the application of fundamental rights between 
private parties. The judges presiding over each of these cases applied different 
constitutional provisions to arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions on the matter.  
The first case was a decision delivered on 5th April 2013 by Lenaola J which 
concerned a constitutional petition by Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (‘Mr. Kenyatta’) in 
which he complained about a publication by the Nairobi Star newspaper which 
suggested that he was involved in a plot to murder the former head of the outlawed 
Mungiki sect. The publication also suggested that if Mr. Kenyatta succeeded in his 
presidential quest, he would be the most depraved president the country would ever 
                                                          
5C Mak ‘Interaction between Fundamental Rights and Contract Law’ in Fundamental Rights in European Contract 
Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual Relationships in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, England 47, 48. 
6C O’Cinniede ‘Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect – A Successful Experiment’ in Human Rights 
& the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study 245. 
7Ibid. 












know.9Mr. Kenyatta argued that the publication constituted a gross violation of the 
constitutional right to freedom of expression and the media.10 
On its part, Nairobi Star objected to Mr. Kenyatta’s petition arguing that the 
fundamental rights and freedoms set out in the Kenyan Constitution can only be 
enforced against the state and state organs and not private individuals as sought by Mr. 
Kenyatta. Nairobi Star further argued that Mr. Kenyatta’s claim if any, was a claim under 
the tort of defamation and could only be remedied in a civil suit and not through a 
constitutional petition. 
In determining the matter, Lenaola J relied on Article 21(1) of the Kenyan 
Constitution and local and international case law to find that fundamental rights and 
freedoms did not apply between private parties.11 In his view, the said provision required 
the state and every state organ to observe, protect, promote and fulfil the fundamental 
rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights. He observed that a similar obligation had not 
been imposed on private parties. Lenaola J quoted with approval the findings of Maxwell 
C.J. in Teitiwnnang and Ariong & Others12, where the latter stated that: 
‘Dealing now with the question can a private individual maintain an action for 
declaration against another private individual or individuals for breach of the 
fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution. The rights and duties of 
individuals and between individuals are regulated by private law. The 
Constitution on the other hand is an instrument of Government. It contains rules 
about the Government of the country. It is my view therefore that the duties 
imposed by the Constitution under the fundamental rights provisions are owed 
by the Government of the day to the governed. I am of the opinion that an 
individual or a group of individuals as in this case, cannot owe a duty under the 
fundamental rights provisions to another individual so as to give rise to an action 
against the individual or a group of individuals...no action for a declaration that 
                                                          
9Kenyatta vs. Nairobi Star Publications Limited High Court Petition No. 187 of 2012. Article 33 of the Constitution 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression while Article 34 guarantees the right to freedom of the media. 
10Mr. Kenyatta was elected as the President of the Republic of Kenya on 9th April 2013. 
11Article 21 of the Constitution states that: 
“It is a fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe respect, promote and fulfil the 
fundamental rights and freedoms in the Bill of rights. The local cases relied upon by Justice Lenaola were all 
decided under the former Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (1969) and their application and relevance to the 
current case is rather doubtful. 












there has been a breach of duty under the provision can be or be maintained in 
the case before me, and I so hold.’ 
Contrast the above decision with a second one that was delivered by Githua J 
on 21st December 2012.13 In this case, Cradle, a non-governmental organization with a 
mandate to protect the rights of children sought an order to compel Nation Media Group 
Limited (Nation Media’) to provide sign language insets or subtitles in all newscasts, 
educational programmes and all programmes covering events of national significance. 
Cradle argued that Nation Media’s failure to do so constituted a violation of the express 
provisions of section 39 of the Persons with Disabilities Act as well as a violation of the 
constitutional right of persons with disabilities to receive information and not to be 
discriminated against on account of their disability.14 
On its part, Nation Media argued that pursuant to Article 21(1) of the Kenyan 
Constitution, it is the duty of the state and not Nation Media to address the needs of 
vulnerable groups in society. Nation Media further argued that the implementation of 
sign language insets was costly and would expose it to heavy losses. It justified its 
position on the basis of Article 44(1) of the Kenyan Constitution which entitled it to use a 
language of its choice including sign language.15Nation Media further argued that the 
orders sought by Cradle if granted would amount to interference or control of Nation 
Media’s broadcasting function contrary to Article 34 of the Kenyan Constitution.16 
In determining the matter, Githua J relied on Article 2(1) and Article 20(1) of the 
Kenyan Constitution as a basis for finding that the Bill of Rights ‘applies to all laws and 
binds all state organs and all persons’.17 In her view, state organs as well as private 
entities such as Nation Media were bound to respect and obey all the provisions of the 
                                                          
13Cradle (The Children Foundation) suing as trustee through Geoffrey Maganya vs. Nation Media Group Limited, 
High Court JR. Misc. App. No. 217 of 2011. 
14 Article 27(4) and 27(5) state that: 
“(4) The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any grounds including race, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, dress, language or birth. 
(5) A person shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against another person on any of the grounds specified or 
contemplated in clause (4).” 
15 Article 44(1) states that: 
“Every person has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of the person’s choice.” 
16 Article 34(2)(a) of the Constitution states that: 
“The State shall not; 
(a) Exercise control over or interference with any person engaged in broadcasting, the production or circulation 
of any publication or the dissemination of information by any medium.” 
17See note 11 on Article 21(1) of the Constitution. Article 2(1) of the Constitution states that: 













Kenyan Constitution. She therefore found that the Kenyan Constitution imposed a duty 
on all persons and not just the state to ensure access by persons with disabilities to all 
places, public transport and information. In reaching this conclusion, Githua J stated 
that: 
‘The Constitution makes it clear that there is both a vertical – state to citizen and 
horizontal – citizen to citizen application of the Bill of Rights…’ 
The Kenyatta Case and the Cradle Case are currently pending before the Court 
of Appeal of Kenya for determination. Consequently, neither decision can be said to 
conclusively represent the correct legal position on the matter in Kenya.18 These cases 
and (several others discussed in Chapter 3) are illustrative of the confusion that exists in 
Kenya regarding the application of fundamental rights in the private sphere. Indeed, one 
could be forgiven for wondering whether the legislators of the Kenyan Constitution truly 
intended that fundamental rights should apply between private parties or whether such 
an application (if any) was the unintended consequence of heavy borrowing of 
constitutional provisions from other jurisdictions such as Germany and South Africa; 
both of which have very unique constitutional histories and took deliberate steps to 
ensure that fundamental rights could be enforced against private actors.19 
II Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to consider whether the Kenyan Constitution 
supports a horizontal application of fundamental rights and if so, the extent to which the 
courts in Kenya may enforce such rights against private persons. The study offers a 
considered analysis of when and how fundamental rights should be applied to private 
relations. In this regard, it is a modest attempt to contribute to the almost non-existent 
jurisprudence of the concept of ‘horizontality’20 in Kenya and it is also hoped that the 
study will be of practical interest to judges and legal practitioners. Although the study is 
mainly concerned with the intervention of fundamental rights in contractual relationships, 
a number of the examples that will be referred to shall be drawn from cases dealing with 
                                                          
18The writer is not aware of any decisions of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Appeal that deal with 
the issue of the application of fundamental rights and freedoms between private parties. 
19D Oliver and J Fedtke in Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study observe that the Basic 
Law is in many respects a reaction to the severe human rights violations committed in Germany following Hitler’s 
rise to power in January 1933, violations committed not only by the state and its agents but also by single 
individuals or organizations outside any official context. They also observed that in South Africa, a full application 
of human rights in the private sphere was regarded as the most appropriate safeguard against ‘privatized 
apartheid’. 128,361. 
20Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights at 3-4 describe the term 












tort actions as some of the issues arising in those cases are relevant to the matters 
under discussion. 
III Hypothesis 
This study proceeds from the presumption that both fundamental rights and 
freedom of contract are extremely important for any legal order. However, the study 
acknowledges that the two concepts will sometimes conflict particularly when 
fundamental rights are applied to private relations. This study seeks to explore ways in 
which a balance can be struck between the two concepts in order to ensure the 
maximum protection of fundamental rights with the minimum amount of interference with 
the contractual autonomy of parties.21 
The study proposes that an indirect horizontal approach offers the best method 
of striking this balance as it acknowledges the importance of fundamental rights while at 
the same time seeks to resolve conflicts primarily through the prism of private law.22 It is 
therefore regarded as a compromise between the dangers of suffocating state 
intervention via broadly phrased constitutional phrases and an equally unattractive 
acceptance of unrestricted commercial power in the private sphere.23 
The study further proposes that whereas an indirect horizontal approach is the 
preferred method of ensuring that fundamental rights are protected in the private sphere, 
it is not on its own, an adequate means of achieving this objective and will require to be 
complemented by legislation that is aimed at giving effect to the fundamental rights in 
question. 
IV Literature Review 
It is not possible to set out a comprehensive literature review of the study. I 
therefore propose to briefly discuss a few of the principle works that have been referred 
to in the study. 
The theoretical framework of the study is principally drawn from the early works 
of Pound’s essay titled ‘Liberty of Contract’.24 Whereas the application of fundamental 
rights in the private sphere has always been perceived as an unwarranted interference 
with contractual autonomy, Pound’s article suggests that this doctrine was never 
                                                          
21O’Cinniede op cit (n6) 243. 
22Fedtke op cit (n2)153. 
23Fedtke op cit (n2)155. 












envisaged as being entirely free from restrictions or limitations. He does so by explaining 
how the laws of equity and other legal doctrines have always played a role in limiting 
contractual autonomy. This study relies on the arguments made by Pound to justify the 
restrictive role that fundamental rights play in the private sphere. 
The works of Bhana & Pieterse in ‘Toward a Reconciliation of Contract Law and 
Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited as well as the works of Cockrell in 
‘Can You Paradigm? – Another Perspective on the Public Law/Private Law Divide’ 
provide extremely valuable insights on the concept of bargaining power in contractual 
relationships. Both authors provide what is perhaps the strongest justification for the 
intervention of human rights in the private sphere by drawing a distinction between 
‘formal equality’ and ‘genuine equality’ in contractual transactions. Their studies lend 
support to the proposition that fundamental rights ought to play a greater role in 
contracts that do not appear to represent a genuine equality in bargaining power. 
Excerpts from Professor Liebenberg’s book titled Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution are extensively cited in the study. 
Although her focus is on the enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa, she 
provides a comprehensive analysis on the horizontal enforcement of fundamental rights 
and makes a very strong case for their direct enforcement in the private sphere. Her 
position suggests that constitutional norms and values should take precedence over 
contractual autonomy. However, unlike Liebenberg’s position, this study argues that 
neither of the two legal concepts ought to privilege the other. 
The study also refers extensively to the works of Collins, a professor at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science. In a Law Society Economy Working 
Paper titled ‘The (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law, Collins 
argues that fundamental rights (as traditionally understood) are unsuitable for the 
resolution of  disputes between private parties. He therefore advocates for the 
‘modification’ or ‘translation’ of fundamental rights before they can be suitably 
transposed into the private sphere. Collins works are significant to the study as they 
serve to highlight some of the difficulties that are likely to arise from the practical 
application of fundamental rights in the private sphere and make various suggestions of 












The study also refers to an  article authored by Cherendnychenko titled 
‘Subordinating Contract Law to Fundamental Rights: Towards a Major Breakthrough or 
Towards Walking Circles where she discusses the question of horizontality from a 
European perspective and advocates for the limitation of the impact of fundamental 
rights in the private sphere. Whereas Liendenberg argues that fundamental rights 
should play a greater role in the private sphere in order to protect weaker parties, 
Cherednychenko is of the view that fundamental rights should play a limited role in the 
private sphere. She argues that a dispute between private parties is to remain 
substantively and procedurally a private law dispute even though the rights and duties 
arising under the contract would be influenced by constitutional rights. Similar views are 
expressed by Cheadle, Davis & Haysom in their book titled South African Constitution 
Law: The Bill of Rights. The approach proposed by Cherednychenko is significant to this 
study because it is consistent with an indirect horizontal effect which the study 
recommends as being the most appropriate approach for Kenya’s legal system. 
Finally a comparative study of how countries such as South Africa, Germany, 
Ireland, Canada and USA have dealt with the issue of horizontality is carried out in 
Chapter 4 of this study. This analysis mainly relies on a collection of studies on 
horizontality by various authors which have been compiled by Fedtke & Oliver in Human 
Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study. 
V Overview of the Study 
Chapter 2 begins by examining the implications of the public/private divide on 
the application of fundamental rights to private relations. It also explores the different 
arguments made in support of the horizontal application of fundamental rights including 
the fact that such an intervention serves to protect the weaker party in contractual 
disputes. The arguments made in opposition to the application of fundamental rights in 
the private sphere are also discussed in this chapter. Here, the main concern raised is 
that such an application would interfere with a party’s autonomy and freedom of 
contract.25 Chapter 2 concludes with a brief analysis of South African case law on the 
point. 
Chapter 3 traces the development of fundamental right in Kenya from the period 
before the promulgation of Kenyan Constitution to date. Various provisions of the 
                                                          
25E Barendt ‘The United States and Canada: State Action, Constitutional Rights and Private Actors’ in Human 












Kenyan Constitution are also examined with a view to considering whether they lend 
support to the horizontal application of fundamental rights. The main focus of this 
chapter is however on the different ways in which fundamental rights can be enforced 
against private parties; that is, directly or indirectly. Also discussed are the merits and 
demerits of an indirect and a direct horizontal approach to the application of fundamental 
rights in the private sphere. Chapter 3 concludes with a comparative analysis of the 
approach that various countries such as Germany, South Africa, Ireland, Canada and 
USA have adopted with regard to the application of fundamental rights in the private 
sphere.  
Chapter 4 is concerned with the question of when and how to apply 
fundamental rights in the private sphere. The chapter begins by setting out the factors 
that the courts ought to consider when determining whether fundamental rights should 
be applied horizontally. It also examines the adequacy of the proportionality test as a 
means for ‘balancing’ fundamental rights when they come in conflict in private disputes 
and explains why this test may require substantial modifications to render it appropriate 
for a horizontal application.  
The final chapter identifies some of the challenges that affect the application of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in the private sphere in Kenya. The focus of this 
chapter is on two issues, namely; a) an inflexible legal culture and constitutional tradition 
in Kenya and b) the custom of ‘contracting out’ or contractual waiver. Chapter 5 













Freedom of Contract versus the Need to Protect the Weaker Party 
 
‘Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a present exigency, will 
submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.’ – Lord Northington26 
This chapter seeks to identify the theoretical location of fundamental rights in 
the private sphere. The study begins by discussing the implications of the application of 
fundamental rights to the public/private divide. Thereafter, it examines the doctrine of 
freedom of contract with a view to exploring the extent of its boundaries. Ultimately, the 
central question that this chapter seeks to answer is whether the need to protect the 
weaker party in a contractual relationship justifies a limitation or restriction of the 
contractual freedom of others by means of fundamental rights. 
I Public and Private Law 
Public law was developed in response to actual and potential abuses of power 
by public authorities. The content and character of those rights has evolved to combat 
different kinds of abuse of power encountered in that context, whether it be the 
imposition of restrictions on liberty by a majority in the legislature in the name of some 
particular values or religion, or the misuse of coercive powers by executive agencies 
such as the police.27Although analogous problems of abuse of power may occur in a 
private law context, they are not generally speaking, a central concern of private law. 
Private law is more oriented towards the protection of economic interests of individuals 
against harms caused by other individuals, whether through commission of wrongs 
against those interests or breaches of contractual undertakings and other promises.28 
Accordingly, the idea has always been that ‘public law’ governs the relations 
between persons and the state, while private law is concerned with the relationship 
between individual citizens.29 Whereas in public law rights serve principally as a 
defensive weapon against infringement by the state, in private law, rights are positive 
claims (often described as interests) that must be balanced between the 
                                                          
26Vernon v Bethel, 2 Eden 110,113. 
27H Collins ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in LSE Law Society & Economy 
Working Papers 7/2012 11,12. 
28Ibid. 













parties.30Further, while public law is actively interventionist, private law is considered to 
be minimalist.31 
Legal critics have often argued that the differences between private and public 
law provide the underlying reason for doubt about the practicality and appropriateness of 
inserting fundamental rights into private law.32Collins makes this point as follows; 
“.. the proposal to use fundamental rights to determine the rules governing 
private relationships breaks down the traditional legal demarcation between the 
rules of public law, which govern the relation between the citizen and the state 
and the rules of private law which regulate private relations between citizens 
and business associations. The categories of public and private law are perhaps 
legal constructions that may not matter very much in themselves and a blurring 
of those boundaries may not create a serious risk for a legal system. However, 
the boundaries are not pointless. They have evolved as a functional response to 
practical problems of government and adjudication.33 
However, Gertenberg &Van der Walt argue that private and public law are 
intertwined and inseparable and that coherence throughout an entire legal system is 
more likely to be achieved through some method of ensuring a common set of values 
apply in both areas than by creating unsustainable barriers.34 Similarly, Cockrell, argues 
that every facet of private law carries with it a public aspect.35 In other words, all law, 
both private and public, rests ultimately on the core protection of fundamental rights and 
if this is true; then there can be no objection in principle to granting horizontal effect to 
fundamental rights.36 
There is a school of thought that suggests that public law and private law should 
be treated separately because the relationship between the state and the individual is 
essentially one of unequal parties whereas private law is concerned with relationships 
between parties who are possessed of equal power.37Cockrell disagrees with this 
assertion; he states that one only needs to look at the vast disparities of power that 
                                                          
30Collins op cit (n27) 4. 
31Cockrell  op cit (n29) 223. 
32Collins op cit (n27) 14. 
33Collins op cit (n27) 32. 
34O’Cinniede op cit (n6) 247. 
35Cockrell op cit (n29) 220 
36Collins op cit (n27) 20. 












attaches to the unequal possession of material resources in contemporary society to see 
that contractual relationships between private persons are not always equal. He argues 
that a shift of focus from ‘formal equality’ to ‘economic inequality’ will reveal the vast 
imbalances in power between private parties that were hitherto suppressed.38 As we 
shall see later in this chapter, the absence of ‘genuine equality’ of bargaining power (as 
opposed to ‘formal equality’) between contracting parties provides one of the strongest 
justifications for the intervention of fundamental rights in the private sphere. 
It has also been contended that the application of fundamental rights in a private 
law context would result in ascribing to them a function outside their original scope and 
purpose.39Legal critics have also expressed concern about the ability of broadly phrased 
constitutional principles to provide adequate solutions for the more intricate problems of 
private law. They argue that the open-endedness of constitutional values means that 
their content is inevitably contested and consequently, can become a ground for 
competing political philosophies such as libertarianism and egalitarianism.40 
As stated above, fundamental rights are particularly important in situations of 
unequal contractual bargaining power. They lso operate as a remedy of last resort in 
situations where private law does not provide any remedy or is insufficient. Further, 
while it is true that constitutional norms are broadly phrased and were not conceived 
with private interests in mind, there is nothing to prevent the courts from developing and 
modifying the content of a particular fundamental right to render it suitable for application 
in the private context. This can also be achieved through the formulation of legislation 
aimed at giving effect to the various fundamental rights. In Kenya, such legislation 
includes the Employment Act and the National Gender & Equality Commission Act, the 
Consumer Protection Act and the Basic Education Act among others. 
II Freedom of Contract 
One of the strongest arguments lodged against the application of fundamental 
rights in the private law sphere is that a horizontal application of fundamental rights will 
constitute an unwarranted intrusion of the contractual autonomy of individuals.41 
Consequently, those opposed to the application of fundamental rights in the private 
                                                          
38Cockrell op cit (n29) 227, 228. 
39Collins op cit (n27) 12,13. 
40D Bhana & M Pieterse ‘Toward a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox 
Revisited’ SAHRLJ (2005) 876. 












sphere often advocate for an autonomous civil society with which the state should 
interfere as little as necessary.42I discuss this argument below. 
Private law is aimed at providing strong protection to vested private property 
rights and the negative freedom to contract freely without undue judicial intervention 
(expressed in the doctrine, pacta sunt servanda).43 In the United States, for example, it 
is said that the great object of the framers of the constitution undoubtedly was to secure 
the inviolability of contracts. This principle was to be protected in whatever form it might 
be assailed. The fundamental maxims of free government seemed to require that the 
rights of personal liberty and private property be held sacred.44 
In other jurisdictions, the freedom to contract was regarded as a natural right.45 
The decision to enter into a potentially restrictive private law relationship in the first place 
was in many cases considered to be an expression of private autonomy and as such, a 
consequence of freewill of the parties.46The value of liberty was in its classical sense 
understood to imply that individuals were free to choose how to live their lives and that 
no entity should be allowed to interfere with individual choices which have freely been 
made.47 This was emphasized in the case of Allgeyer v Louisiana,48 where Mr. Justice 
Bradely stated that: 
‘The liberty mentioned … means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from 
mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration; but the term is 
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen… to be free to...enter into all 
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a 
successful conclusion the purposes mentioned above.’ 
In England, freedom of contract was viewed as a means of enhancing human 
progress.49Mr. Justice Field who led the individualist crusade was of the view that the 
individual counted for more than the state imposed law.50The individualist’s task was 
therefore to abolish a body of antiquated institutions that stood in the way of human 
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progress; freedom of contract was viewed as the best instrument at hand for this 
purpose. Common law too became thoroughly individualistic.51 
Arguably, the result was the exaggeration of private rights at the expense of the 
public interest. Blackstone’s proposition that ‘the public good is in nothing more 
essentially interested than in the protection of every individual’s private right’ was quoted 
in more than one decision. Courts concerned themselves primarily with the formal 
validity and enforcement of contracts rather than their substantive fairness. The result 
was a certain prediction and efficient framework within which parties could 
contract.52Most courts overthrew legislation that was considered in derogation of liberty, 
and insisted that only common law incapacities could be given legal recognition and that 
new incapacities; growing out of new conditions in business and industry could not be 
taken advantage of in legislation.53 The right to contract freely was to yield only to the 
safety, health or moral welfare of the public.54 
According to the scholarship of Pound, this approach assumed that incapacities 
not known to common law could not be recognized by the legislature and ignored the 
fact that Courts of Chancery had wielded a not inconsiderable power of interference with 
freedom of contract.55 In fact, freedom of contract has always been limited by public 
interests.56 From the time that promises not under seal have been enforced, equity had 
interfered with contracts in the interests of weak, necessitous, or unfortunate promisors. 
Common law, it was said, would not help a fool but equity existed to help and protect 
him. As Pound observed, ‘it is because there are fools to be defrauded and imposed 
upon and unfortunates to meet with accidents and careless to make mistakes that we 
have courts of equity.’57In other words, the law of contract may enable individuals to 
pursue their goals by making binding transactions but it will not enforce every promise 
that was made. For instance, it will consider whether there was a good reason for 
entering the transaction (by requiring the presence of some form of consideration), or 
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whether consent given to the contract or whether it was vitiated by force, fraud, or undue 
influence or involved an illegality.58 
In Kenya, the court will set aside contracts that are proved to have been 
affected by common law grounds such as incapacity, mistake, fraud, misrepresentation, 
public policy, and duress. Accordingly, the potential today of contract law to address the 
problems faced by weaker parties is not surprising because the idea of protecting the 
weaker party was not entirely repugnant to it. Contract law has always been concerned 
with imbalances in power which may arise for example between minors and uneducated 
people in general on the one hand and on the other, potentially much more powerful 
market actors on the other.59 
This raises the question whether there is a need to afford the weaker party 
additional protections through the intervention of fundamental rights when the law of 
contracts and common law in general has already done so. As Cherednychenko, states: 
‘the fact that fundamental rights are hardly suitable for resolving disputes 
between private parties in contract law means that the need to shift the 
emphasis from contract law to the level of fundamental rights in order to ensure 
the protection of the weaker party in contract law could only be justified if 
contract law were unable to address this issue itself.’60 
It must be recalled however, that private law (and therefore contract law) is the 
product of an aggregation of different principles and rules shaped over a long period of 
historical and legal development, much of which predated the coming into force of 
modern human rights values. As a result, private law was not intended or designed with 
the intention of vindicating fundamental rights. Further, it tends to focus on the conduct 
of the defendant rather than the entitlements of the plaintiff. All this means that existing 
private law norms may often be an inadequate tool to deliver sufficient protection for an 
individual’s constitutional right.61 
For example, one will not find a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, and other protected characteristics in the common law of contract. Private law 
has also not adequately adapted its protection of privacy in view of modern technologies 
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such as the camera in the nineteenth century as well as current threats to privacy posed 
by the vast technologies of covert surveillance. A horizontal application of fundamental 
rights in such cases may therefore be beneficial in the sense of updating the law to 
modern values and its social context.62 
In conclusion, a solid system of contract law cannot be based predominantly on 
an interpretation of sanctity of contract that in turn is based purely on a limited notion of 
consensus as articulated in crystallized rules. While such a construction promotes the 
worthy policy objectives of certainty, predictability and efficiency, it is also important for 
the law of contract to adequately accommodate competing social (normative) 
considerations like fairness, dignity and social equality.63As stated above, private law is 
not always sufficiently equipped to achieve this, hence the need for fundamental rights 
in the private sphere. 
III The Need to Protect the Weaker Party 
Legal history reveals many examples of constitutional courts declaring social 
legislation designed to protect weaker parties as invalid under the constitution on the 
ground that it deprived the holders of rights such as rights to property of their 
entitlements. In particular, in the United States, both at federal and state level, courts 
manipulated the constitution to assist challenges to legislation designed to help weaker 
parties such as workers on the ground that such legislation was a restriction of individual 
freedom or an interference with the right to private property.64 
However, there are certain contexts in which it is particularly appropriate to 
impose positive duties on private actors to protect or facilitate fundamental rights. Such 
situations may arise where there is a special relationship between the parties or where 
the private entity has significant power to control access to a particular social resource 
or service.65 The Constitutional Court of South Africa affirmed this in the case of 
Khumalo vs. Homolisa66  where it held that the application of any right in the Bill of 
Rights to a private party should depend on the power of the private party concerned to 
undermine the interests and values protected by the particular right.67 
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The classical model of contract envisages consensus on the basis of theoretical 
arm’s length negotiations in trade and industry between parties of roughly equal 
standing.68 In practice however, prospective contracting parties often face a stark choice 
between agreeing to contractual terms as presented or not contracting at all. Terms are 
therefore generally imposed upon them by certain parties (such as employers and 
consumers) rather than negotiated. This is most often the direct result of an inequality in 
bargaining power between the parties and the absence of any real freedom of choice or 
negotiation when contracting.69 
In addition, many clauses have become ‘standard’ in various industries (such as 
exemption clauses in the private health care sector or time limitation clauses in the 
insurance industry) with the result that although consumers can choose with whom to 
contract, they have no real freedom in relation to the terms of the contract. More often 
than not economic necessity compels a party to contract and that means that in reality 
there is no freedom to contract.70Yet the realities of economic pressures and unequal 
bargaining power between contracting parties and its effect on consensus largely remain 
a non-issue for the law of contract. Contracts are consistently upheld on the basis of 
long standing rules of contract law as founded in the concept of consensus. The reality 
of unequal bargaining power undermines the very notion of freedom along with the 
substance of consensus underlying pacta sunt servanda.71 
In view of the foregoing, this study proposes that the role of the law ought to be 
viewed from two perspectives; on the one hand, the law should operate to assist people 
to make worthwhile choices but on the other, it should deter or frustrate efforts by people 
to make unwise bargains that are not in their long-term interest. If this freedom is used 
for instance to harm the dignity of another, to invade another’s privacy, or to exploit the 
weakness of another or more controversially to harm oneself, it is arguably not serving a 
worthwhile purpose.72In other words, whilst a person is at liberty to impose constraints 
on himself by contract, freedom to impose these constraints in the hands of the weak 
and necessitous defeats the very end of liberty.73 
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A court will therefore be asked to strengthen or enlarge the existing protection 
for fundamental rights in order to strike a new balance between competing rights and 
interests. This legal reasoning emphasizes the importance of party autonomy or 
freedom of contract but it is understood in the broad sense to require genuine autonomy 
which ensures weaker parties proper possibilities for self-determination, unconstrained 
by pressure or deficits in information. The effect of this reasoning is to assist the position 
of a weaker party to redress a situation of structural inequality.74 
In summary, the principle of freedom of contract must be respected but it should 
be capable of limitation where significant inequalities in the parties negotiating positions 
imply that one of the contracting parties has such weight that unilaterally determines the 
contents of the contract. It will then be up to the law to attempt to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of the parties involved are guaranteed in order to prevent self-
determination being transformed into domination by the stronger over the weaker 
party.75 
IV  The Courts’ Approach to the Application of Fundamental Rights in the 
Private Sphere 
While it is generally accepted that the main objective of resorting to fundamental 
rights in contract law is the protection of the weaker party, it less clear to what extent 
such protection should extend or, indeed entail. For instance, should a surety who 
concedes that he received independent legal advice be bound by the terms of a 
potentially ruinous agreement with the bank? Further, if it is the issue of informed 
consent that is at stake, under what circumstances will the stronger party be deemed to 
have fulfilled his obligation to explain the risks of the transaction to the weaker party.76. 
The answers to these questions are to be found in case law. It is therefore appropriate 
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a) Brisley vs.Drotsky (‘Brisley’)78 
Brisley, concerned the validity of a non-variation clause in a standard form lease 
according to which any alterations or variations of the contract would be valid only if 
recorded in writing. Despite this the parties orally agreed that the applicant could pay her 
rent late for a few months. Later, the respondent refused to accept the late rent and 
evicted the applicant. The court rejected the applicant’s plea to enforce the oral 
agreement and upheld the eviction. In doing so, Cameron JA clearly affirmed that all law 
including the common law of contract derives its force from the constitution and ‘is 
subject to constitutional control’.79He however cautioned that the constitution and its 
value system does not give courts ‘a general jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the 
basis of judicially perceived notions of unjustness or to determine their enforceability on 
the basis of imprecise notions of good faith….80 He observed that the constitutional 
values of dignity, equality and freedom ‘require that the courts approach their task of 
striking down contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive restraint.81 
The court also emphasized that non-variation clauses protect both the ‘stronger’ 
and the weaker parties to a contract and that overturning the Shifren principle (the 
principle according to which an oral variation would be invalid in the face of a non-
variation clause) would cause tremendous uncertainty in the law of contract.82 
Liebenberg has criticized the approach of the court in Brisley arguing that the 
decision illustrates the courts’ insistence on the strict enforcement of contracts and the 
limited role envisaged for infusing open ended normative values and standards such as 
good faith and public policy with constitutional rights and values in the evaluation of 
contractual disputes.83She also disagrees with the reasoning that the sanctity of contract 
is a right in the Bill of Rights;84  a view that is  supported by Bhana &Pieterse who  
criticize the Brisley decision for its lack of engagement with the content of the values 
underlying the Constitution.85Bhana &Pieterse further argue that the content given to the 
value of freedom (and as a result contractual autonomy) is illustrative of the court’s 
failure to acknowledge and engage with the inequalities in bargaining power between 
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the respective parties to the case.86Similarly, Cheadle, Haysom& Davis have criticized 
the decision in Brisley stating that: 
“..the SA Constitution is not reflective of a laissez faire model of the economy in 
which commercial autonomy is an unqualified good but rather it encompasses a 
social democratic vision for South Africa in which commercial autonomy must 
be tempered by way of flexibility inherent in the value of good faith… it appears 
that the Chinese wall between public and private law and the jurisprudential 
amnesia about the effect of private power remain alive in our law…’87 
b) Afrox Health Care Bpk vs. Strydom (Afrox) 88 
Afrox concerned the validity of a contract signed by the respondent when he 
was admitted to hospital. The contract included a clause exempting the hospital for 
negligence of any of its staff. After suffering damage as a result of a nurse’s negligence 
during post-operative care, the respondent argued that the clause was against public 
interest and he urged the court to invalidate it in light of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights. The court acknowledged that the notions of public policy and public interest in 
contract law had now to be interpreted in light of the rights and values enshrined in the 
constitution.89 However, the Court dismissed the respondent’s contention that the 
exemption clause was contrary to public policy on grounds that the respondent had 
adduced no evidence that he was in fact in a weaker bargaining position than the private 
hospital concerned.90 
The court observed that a contractual term is only contrary to public interest 
when either due to extreme unfairness or other policy considerations, it conflicts with the 
interests of the community.91Smallberger JA cautioned that: 
‘The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should however be 
exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases lest uncertainty as to the 
validity of contracts result from arbitrary and indiscriminate use of power…in 
grappling with this often difficult problem, it must be born in mind that public 
policy generally favours the utmost freedom of contract and requires that 
                                                          
86Bhana & Pieterse op cit (n40) 882. 
87Cheadle, Davis &Haysom op  cit (n20) 33-11. 
88Afrox Health Care Bpk vs. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
89Afrox Health Care Bpk vs. Strydom supra (n88) at para 8. 
90Afrox Health Care Bpk vs. Strydom supra (n88) at para12. 












commercial transactions should not be unduly trammelled by restrictions on that 
freedom.’92 
The court also held that contractual autonomy which finds expression in the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda was a competing value also supported by constitutional 
values.93 It affirmed its rejection in Brisley of bona fides as a free floating ground for 
setting aside unfair contractual provisions re-emphasizing that principles of bona fides 
are abstract values rather than legal rules and courts cannot and should not apply such 
values instead of crystallized legal rules.94 
According to Le Roux &Van Marle, the court in Afrox (as well as in Brisley) 
focused solely on the traditional benefits offered by sanctity of contract and its 
established position in the law and ignored its potentially unjust consequences.95 
Similarly, Liebenberg has argued that the court’s reasoning in Afrox was based on a 
particularly formalistic and impoverished interpretation of section 27(1)(a) (on the right to 
access to healthcare) and the values and interests it protects.96 In her view, the court 
fails to provide substantive reasoning as to why the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
should be preferred in the specific circumstances of the case over the value of ensuring 
a remedy to those who suffer damage as a result of negligent medical care. 
c) Barkhuizen vs. Napier (‘Barkhuizen’)97 
The case of Barkhuizen involved a constitutional challenge to a time limitation 
clause in a short-term in urance contract. The clause in question required the claimant 
to institute court proceedings within 90 days after the insurance company had rejected 
the claim. However, the applicant only did so two years later and sought to challenge the 
limitation clause relied upon by the insurance company on grounds that it violated 
section 34 of the Bill of Rights which guaranteed the right to approach a court for 
redress as well as public policy which also protected this right. The Court found that 
while section 34 of the SA Constitution did not give it a general power to refrain from 
enforcing contractual terms on the basis of its own perceptions of justice or imprecise 
notions of good faith, they were obliged to invalidate contractual terms that were 
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offensive to public policy.98 The content of public policy was in turn, supposed to be 
determined having regard to the founding constitutional values of human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-
racialism and non-sexism.99Cameron J reiterated the views expressed in Brisley that: 
‘…the liberty to regulate one’s life by freely engaged contractual arrangements 
gave expression in appropriate circumstances to the constitutional values of 
autonomy and dignity. This required courts to be generally cautious in intruding 
on apparently voluntarily concluded arrangements. An important factor in 
determining whether constitutional values of dignity and equality required the 
court to develop the common law of contracts so as to invalidate the term was 
the relative bargaining position of the parties…’ 
On appeal to the Constitutional Court, it was held that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the contract was not freely concluded between parties with equal 
bargaining power or that the applicant was not aware of the clause.100 The court 
confirmed that the current law as interpreted in Briskley, envisaged a limited role for 
good faith, not as a self-standing rule but as n underlying value that is given expression 
through existing rules of law.101Ncobo J noted that: 
‘Pacta sunt servanda...as the Supreme Court of Appeal has repeatedly noted, 
gives effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-
autonomy or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own 
detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity.’102 
Cheadle, Haysom& Davis have argued that Barkhuizen represents a lost 
opportunity for the courts to engage with the spirit purport and objects of the Constitution 
and thereby to imbue South Africa’s law of contract with conceptions of justice, and 
equality as opposed to the adoption of abstract liberalism and non contextualism.103 
d) Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Limited (‘Maphango’)104 
Finally, in the more recent decision of Maphango, the minority of the court, 
found that parties who freely and voluntarily enter into a lease containing clauses that 
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allow either party to terminate them on notice do not qualify the right of a party to so 
terminate a lease and cannot seek judicial interference with these contractual 
arrangements on the basis of the provisions of fairness.105 
Cheadle, Haysom & Davis have argued that the minority decision of Maphango 
represents a regrettable omission to give any tangible content to the concept of fairness 
within the enquiry as to the enforcement of a contractual term. They also argue that the 
minority turned its face on any engagement with a party who manifestly had far less 
contractual power.106 
In summary, the above cases illustrate that the courts preference for a 
‘restrained’ or ‘formal’ approach to the application of fundamental rights to contractual 
disputes between private parties. In other words, the courts appear to be hesitant to 
interfere too readily with the common law tradition of pacta sunt servanda. As stated 
above, the main purpose and justification for the intervention of fundamental rights in the 
private sphere is to protect the interests of the weaker party. So far, the approach 
adopted by the courts in South Africa since the advent of the constitutional era 
significantly limits the ability of fundamental rights to achieve this objective.   
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Direct and Indirect Applications of Fundamental Rights to Private Relations 
 
“…I would lay down the principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal 
without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.’- 
Kentridge AJ107 
This chapter begins by tracing the changing views and opinions of Kenyan 
judges on the question of the application of fundamental rights in the private sphere. 
This is followed by an evaluation of various provisions of the Kenyan Constitution with a 
view to establishing whether they support the application of fundamental rights to private 
relations. This chapter will also conduct a comparative study of how various countries 
such as South Africa, Germany, Ireland, Canada and the United States have sought to 
enforce fundamental rights against private actors. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the merits and demerits of a direct and indirect horizontal approach in bid 
to establish which approach is best suited for Kenya’s legal system.  
I  The Changing (and Conflicting) Views on ‘Horizontality’ in Kenya 
All constitutions operate in a vertical manner. Most however, are restricted to a 
vertical operation. This is seldom deliberately done and fixed in the text. It is almost 
always effected by the courts with some or little justification from the text and based on 
the liberal distinction between the public and private sphere and the proposition that the 
purpose of entrenching fundamental rights is to protect the private sphere from 
interference from the state.108 This view is probably true in the case of Kenya. 
The Kenyan Constitution came into effect on 27th August 2010.109 Prior to this, 
constitutional claims were made pursuant to the former constitution of Kenya 
(hereinafter “the Repealed Constitution”). The impact of fundamental rights on private 
law in Kenya can therefore be examined from two perspectives, namely; before, and 
after, the coming into effect of the Kenyan Constitution. A review of the cases that were 
determined under the Repealed Constitution reveal that Kenyan judges tended to favour 
the view that fundamental rights could only be enforced against the state or state 
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organs. The fact that the Repealed Constitution did not contain any provisions that 
expressly or impliedly suggested that fundamental rights could be enforced against 
private persons may have contributed to the reluctance of Kenyan judges to apply 
fundamental rights to private relations. It is therefore not surprising that attempts by 
litigants to enforce the fundamental rights provisions of the Repealed Constitution 
against private parties were almost always resisted by the courts.  
In the widely quoted case of Kenya Bus Service Limited v The Attorney General 
(“Kenya Bus”),110Nyamu J stated that: 
‘…fundamental rights are contained in the [Repealed] Constitution and are 
principally against the State because the [Repealed] Constitution’s function is to 
define what constitutes Government and the governed as it regulates the 
relationship between the Government and the governed. On the other hand the 
rights of the individual interest are taken care of in the province of private law 
and are invariably redressed as such.’ 
Kenya Bus was among the cases relied upon by Lenaola J in reaching the 
conclusion that fundamental rights and freedoms were not applicable to the Kenyatta 
Case referred to in chapter 1 of the study. However, M Oduor, a law lecturer at Moi 
University School of Law in Kenya argues that Kenya Bus was decided under a 
restrictive framework of law and was therefore completely inapplicable in the new 
constitutional framework under which the Kenyatta Case was determined.111 
However, in the case of Mwangi Stephen Mureithi vs. Daniel Toroitich Arap 
Moi,112 (“the Moi Case”) which was also decided under the Repealed Constitution, the 
court took a completely different view regarding question of the applicability of 
fundamental rights to private relations. The Petitioner in the Moi Case had claimed that 
Mr. Moi, a former president of Kenya had unlawfully detained him in order to gain a 
commercial advantage over companies that the two had owned jointly. He argued that 
the unlawful detention was a violation of his constitutional rights under the Repealed 
Constitution.  
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However, Mr. Moi’s lawyers raised an objection to the Petitioner’s action on 
grounds that the fundamental rights set out in the Repealed Constitution could only be 
enforced against the state and state organs and not private individuals such as Mr. Moi. 
They also contended that the Petitioner had raised issues of company law which would 
best be resolved by the commercial courts. In dismissing this objection, Gacheche J 
stated that: 
‘…the rigid position that human rights apply vertically is being overtaken by the 
emerging trends in the development of human rights litigation…We can no 
longer afford to bury our heads in the sand for we must appreciate the realities 
which is that private individuals and bodies  such as clubs and companies wield 
great power over individual citizenry who should as of necessity, be protected 
from such non-state bodies who may for instance discriminate unfairly or cause 
other constitutional breaches…The major challenge to horizontal application of 
human rights is the fact that it (is) a novel area and courts bear great 
responsibility of examining individual cases so as to decide each case on its 
own merits as a horizontal application does not and should not cut across the 
board…I find that fundamental rights are applicable both vertically and 
horizontally save that horizontal application would not apply as a rule but it 
would only be an exception which would obviously demand that the court do 
treat (it) on a case by case basis by examining the circumstances of each case 
before it is legitimized.’ 
The Moi Case is currently pending before the Court of Appeal for determination.  
Whilst Gacheche J ought to be lauded for taking a bold and progressive view on 
the question of horizontality, it is rather doubtful that the Moi Case would hold much 
weight in Kenya given that the judge did not refer to any legal provisions in support of 
her conclusion; instead, she relied entirely on the South African case of Hoffman v 
South Africa Airways113in which the Constitutional Court of South Africa had found that 
the practice of South Africa Airways of not employing people living with HIV as cabin 
crew was unconstitutional. However, foreign case law has no binding force in Kenya and 
is merely of persuasive value.114 
                                                          
113Hoffman v South Africa Airways (CCT17/00) [2000] ZACC 17. 













On the other hand, the Kenyatta Case and the Cradle Case cited in chapter 1 
seem to provide slightly more guidance on the issue of the applicability of fundamental 
rights to private relations in Kenya despite of their conflicting findings. In both cases, 
each of the judges attempts to anchor their findings on various provisions of the Kenyan 
Constitution. In particular, the judge in the Cradle Case relied on Article 2(1) and Article 
20(1) of the Kenyan Constitution in support of the finding that fundamental rights were 
enforceable between private parties. These sections stipulate that the Kenyan 
Constitution is ‘binding on all persons’. The judge therefore interpreted ‘persons’ to 
include individuals and private entities such as the respondent. On the other hand, the 
judge in the Kenyatta Case declined to enforce fundamental rights against a private 
party on grounds that Article 21(1) of the Kenyan Constitution limited the duty to 
‘observe, respect, promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights’ to the 
state and state organs. I examine the meanings and interpretations of these provisions 
in the next section of this chapter. 
II The Constitution Binds ‘the State’, ‘all State Organs’, ‘all Persons’ and ‘all 
Law’ 
As previously stated, a Bill of Rights traditionally confined itself to regulating the 
vertical relationship between the individual and the state.115 However, in certain 
circumstances, the Bill of Rights may directly protect individuals against abuses of their 
rights by other individuals and private institutions.116 For example, in Kenya the right to 
protection against discrimination and the right to receive information are expressly 
stated as applying to the state as well as individuals and private actors. This is provided 
in Article 27(5) and Article 35(1) of the Kenyan Constitution respectively.  
The fact that certain rights are expressly stated to be binding on private persons 
raises the question whether the legislators of the Kenyan Constitution intended to limit 
the horizontal application of fundamental rights to only those rights. It is argued that if 
the legislature had intended to apply the Bill of Rights to persons other than the state, it 
would have stated so explicitly.117My own view on the matter is that it was never the 
intention of the legislators to accord the Kenyan Constitution such a limited interpretation 
or application. I attempt to show why by comparing the relevant provisions of the 
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Kenyan Constitution against corresponding provisions of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa (‘the SA Constitution”).  
Section 8(1) of the SA Constitution provides that ‘the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state are bound by the Bill of Rights.’ An applicant may 
therefore always challenge the conduct of any of these institutions for being inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights.118 This provision is similar to Article 1(3) of the Basic Law of 
Germany which has been interpreted as supporting the effect of fundamental rights in 
the private sphere. This provision states that, ‘the following basic rights shall bind the 
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary as directly applicable law.”119By declaring 
that the legislator is bound ‘by the following basic rights’ the Basic Law creates an 
indirect effect for private relationships since legislation enacted in the area of private law 
will have to comply with these constitutional principles.120 
More importantly however, is the fact that section 8(1) of the SA Constitution (as 
well as Article 1(3) of the Basic Law) have been interpreted to mean that when members 
of the judiciary act in a judicial capacity, be it in a public law or private law context, they 
are bound to respect the Bill of Rights.121 The South African case of Du Plessis v De 
Klerk (“Du Plessis”)122 is significant in this regard. The Court in Du Plessis confirmed 
that the Bill of Rights in the South African Interim Constitution (‘the SA Interim 
Constitution’) had no horizontal application to disputes governed by common law 
between private litigants principally because of the absence of the word ‘judiciary’ in 
section 7 of the SA Interim Constitution.   
This section provided that, ‘[The Bill of Rights] shall bind all legislative and 
executive organs of state at all levels of governments.’ The omission of the word 
‘judiciary’ from this section was interpreted by the court to mean that the Bill of Rights 
placed duties to uphold constitutional rights only on the legislative and executive organs 
of state and individuals were not directly bound by the Bill of Rights. Nor was the 
judiciary which had the task of adjudicating the rights and duties of individuals.123 
However, Cheadle, Haysom& Davis, disagree with this interpretation and argue that the 
reason for the exclusion of the judiciary was because courts are not bound in the same 
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way as the other arms of government in the sense that; if judicial conduct constituted a 
species of conduct that permitted constitutional review every court decision could 
become constitutionally reviewable.124 
While the SA Interim Bill of Rights did not apply directly to horizontal cases, it 
did have an indirect application. This was because it applied to ‘all law in force’ including 
uncodified common law.125Kreigler J in a dissenting opinion in Du Plessis emphasized 
this when he observed that fundamental rights laid down in the SA Constitution 
governed relations between private individuals wherever the law was involved. He is 
famously quoted as stating that: 
‘The Chapter (on the Bill of Rights) has nothing to do with the ordinary 
relationship between private persons or associations. What it does cover is all 
law including that applicable to private relationships. Unless and until there is a 
resort to law, private individuals are at liberty to conduct their private affairs 
exactly as they please as far as fundamental rights are concerned…a landlord 
is free to refuse to let a flat to someone because of race, gender or whatever...a 
church may close its door to mourners of a particular class or colour. But none 
of them can invoke the law to protect their bigotry. The whole gamut of private 
relationships is left undisturbed. But the state as the maker of the laws, the 
administrator of laws and the interpreter and applier of the law is bound to stay 
within the four corners of Chapter 3.’126 
The significance of the above quote is that even if individuals were not directly bound by 
the Bill of Rights, the Courts had to interpret legislation and develop the common law so 
that the ordinary law recognized and protected the rights in the Bill of Rights. This was 
further recognized in section 35(3) of the SA Interim Constitution which provided that ‘in 
the interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law 
and customary law, a court shall have regard to the spirit, purports and objects of … the 
Bill of Rights.’ 
The concern that the Du Plessis decision confined the SA Interim Bill of Rights 
to an indirect horizontal application and thus amounted to a toleration of private violation 
of rights prompted the South African Constitutional Assembly to provide for direct 
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horizontal application of the SA Constitution by making two textual changes. The first 
was the addition of the word ‘judiciary’ which was missing from the application 
provisions of the SA Interim Constitution and the second was the imposition on 
individuals the obligation to uphold the rights of other individuals in section 8(2) of the 
SA Constitution.127 This section provided that, ‘a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 
natural or juristic person, if and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and nature and duty imposed by the right.’ The result was that the 
controversy over the horizontal application of the SA Constitution was to some extent 
settled.128 
Turning now to the corresponding provisions in the Kenyan Constitution, it will 
be noted that Article 20(1) of the Kenyan Constitution is very similar to section 8(1) and 
8(2) of the SA Constitution. This article provides that ‘the Bill of Rights applies to all law 
and binds all state organs and all persons.’ ‘Persons’ is defined in Article 260 of the 
Kenyan Constitution to include, ‘a company, association or other body of persons 
whether incorporated or unincorporated’ while a ‘State Organ’ is defined as ‘a 
commission, office, agency or other body established under the constitution.’ A state 
organ in Kenya would therefore include the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, 
all of which are established under the Kenyan Constitution.129 
The main difference between the provisions of the Kenyan Constitution and the 
SA Constitution is that the latter sets out the limited circumstances under which the Bill 
of Rights may be applied to natural or juristic person ie, depending on the nature of the 
right and duty imposed by the right whereas the Kenyan Constitution is silent on the 
matter. Based therefore, on the South African interpretation of section 8(1) and 8(2) of 
the SA Constitution, it is possible to conclude that section 20(1) of the Kenyan 
Constitution requires that the state and state organs, as well as individuals and private 
entities to respect the Bill of Rights. This interpretation would be consistent with the 
findings of Githua J in the Cradle Case in which she found that the Kenyan Constitution 
has both a vertical and horizontal application.130 Further, the fact that Article 20(1) 
stipulates that ‘the Bill of Rights applies to all law’ means that a legal norm, irrespective 
of whether it is a statutory provision or a rule of common law or  customary law may be 
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constitutionally challenged in any litigation irrespective of whether the parties to the 
litigation are private or public in character.131 
This interpretation would however, not sit very well with the findings of Lenaola 
J in the Kenyatta Case. As stated above, he declined to apply the constitutional right of 
freedom of expression and freedom of the media to the dispute on the basis of his   
understanding that the duty to respect, promote, observe and fulfil fundamental rights 
and freedoms under Article 21(1) of the Kenyan Constitution was limited to the state and 
state organs. It is possible that this conclusion was informed by the judge’s failure to 
read Article 21(1) together with Article 20(1) of the Kenyan Constitution. Had he done 
so, he would have found that the constitutional right of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the media were capable of being enforced against an individual or a private 
entity. Whether such an application was justified in the present case is another issue 
altogether.  
III The Obligation of Courts in South Africa to ‘Develop the Common Law’ 
Section 8(3) of the SA Constitution provides that, ‘when applying a provision of 
the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person, a court, in order to give effect to a right in 
the Bill of Rights, must apply or if necessary, develop, the common law to the extent 
that legislation does not give effect to that right.’ This provision has been interpreted to 
mean that fundamental rights would seldom directly apply to a private dispute. The 
preferred manner to vindicate them in the private sphere would be by way of legislative 
enactment or through developing and or limiting the rules of the common law which 
would conceivably generate more effective remedies for private infringements.132 
Accordingly, a court must first consider whether there is legislation which gives 
adequate effect to the right. If not, the court must consider whether an existing common 
law rule gives effect to the right. If the existing law is deficient, the court is obliged to 
develop the common law to give effect to the right and may at the same time develop 
rules of the common law to limit the right in accordance with section 39(2) of the SA 
Constitution.133 
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A comparison can be drawn between section 8(3) of the SA Constitution on the 
one hand and Article 20(3) (a) of the Kenyan Constitution on the other. Article 20(3)(a) 
of the Kenyan Constitution  states that, ‘In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights, a 
court shall develop the law to the extent that it does not give effect to a right or 
fundamental freedom.’ Whereas the South African provision specifies that the 
development of common law is to be undertaken when a court is applying a fundamental 
right to a natural or juristic person, the Kenyan provision requires that courts develop the 
law when applying fundamental rights generally. Nothing seems to turn on this slight 
distinction; accordingly, I am persuaded that Article 20(3) of the Kenyan Constitution can 
be accorded a similar interpretation to that of section 8(3) of the SA Constitution, that is; 
rather than applying a fundamental right directly, a court must first consider whether 
there is legislation or common law which gives adequate effect to the right. It is only if 
the existing law or common is determined to be deficient or non-existent that the court 
would be obliged to develop the common law to give effect to the fundamental right. 
The requirement for an indirect application before a direct application of the Bill 
of Rights is known in South African jurisprudence as ‘the principle of avoidance.’ 
According to this principle even when the Bill of Rights applies directly, a court must 
apply the provisions of ordinary law to resolve the dispute, especially in so far as the 
ordinary law is intended to give effect to fundamental rights. In South Africa, examples of 
statutes that are intended to give effect to fundamental rights include, the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 among 
others.134 
It is probably worth noting that the judge in the Kenyatta Case declined to apply 
fundamental rights to the case mainly because he was of the view that the petitioner, Mr. 
Kenyatta, had an adequate remedy under the common law tort of defamation. In this 
regard, whilst his interpretation of Article 21(1) of the Kenyan Constitution may have 
been incorrect (he interpreted this section to mean that only the state and state organs 
were bound by the Bill of Rights), I am unable to fault the judge’s ultimate decision to 
refuse to apply fundamental rights to the dispute on the basis that the common law of 
tort afforded the petitioner an adequate remedy as this determination was in conformity 
with the principle of avoidance. 
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It should be noted however, that the principle of avoidance is not an absolute 
rule. It does not dictate that litigants may only directly invoke the constitution as a last 
resort. As with many legal principles, its force depends on the circumstances of the 
case. Where the violation of the constitution is clear and directly relevant to the matter, 
and there is no apparent alternative form of ordinary relief, it is not necessary to waste 
time and effort by seeking a non-constitutional way of resolving the dispute. This will 
often be the case when the constitutionality of a statutory provision is placed in dispute 
because, apart from a reading down, there are no other remedies available to a litigant 
affected by law.135 
VI  Direct Horizontal Effect vs. Indirect Horizontal Effect: A Comparative 
Analysis 
When a litigant directly invokes the Bill of Rights, the purpose is to show the 
inconsistency between the Bill of Rights and law or conduct in order to obtain remedies 
prescribed by the constitution for a violation of a fundamental right.136 Further, in 
disputes in which the Bill of Rights applies as directly applicable law, it overrides 
ordinary law and any conduct that is inconsistent with it. To the extent that ordinary legal 
remedies are inadequate or do not give proper effect to fundamental rights, the Bill of 
Rights generates its own remedies.137This form of application has become known as the 
direct application of the Bill of Rights.138 
At the same time, the Bill of Rights contains a set of values that must be 
respected whenever ordinary law is interpreted, developed or applied. This form of 
application has become known as the indirect application of the Bill of Rights. When 
indirectly applied, the Bill of Rights does not trump ordinary law or generate its own 
remedies. Rather, the Bill of Rights respects the purpose and remedies of ordinary law, 
but demands furtherance of the values contained in it through the operation of ordinary 
law.139 It should be noted however, that there are varying degrees of direct and indirect 
horizontal effects which are beyond the scope of this study.140 
                                                          
135Currie & De Waal op cit (n116) 329. 
136Currie & De Waal op cit (n116) 325. 
137Currie & De Waal op cit (n115) 32. 
138Currie & De Waal op cit (n116) 321. 
139Currie & De Waal op cit (116) 321, See also Currie & De Waal op cit (n115) 32. 
140Cherednychenko op cit (n59) 54 where she draws a distinctions between a ‘strong direct horizontal effect’ and 












No significant difference in outcome between direct and indirect horizontal effect 
is likely to arise unless there is no available private law claim on which to found an 
action in the first place.141Van der Walt argues that the distinction between direct and 
indirect horizontal application may in the end amount to a choice between two 
vocabularies, one which does not shy away from directly invoking constitutional 
principles within the context of common law and one that prefers to let the common law 
principles themselves perform the required mediation between existing law and 
constitutional challenges to such law.142 Similarly, in Du Plessis, Mohamed J stated that: 
“…the true debate is effectively not whether the rights articulated in the Bill of 
Rights are capable of horizontal effect, but whether or not such horizontality is 
to arise  in consequence of a direct  application of the relevant …right or 
through the mechanism of interpreting, applying and developing the common 
law  by having regard  to the spirit, purport  and objects of the Bill of Rights 
pursuant to section 35(3)... the difference in the theoretical approaches 
…therefore seem to me to involve no substantial practical consequences.” 
Although the provisions of a Bill of Rights may ordinarily be applied directly or 
indirectly in a legal dispute, in practice, much of comparative constitutional law is 
actually characterized by the adoption of indirect horizontal approaches.143As the 
comparative study below will show, the preferred view today is that fundamental rights 
do not apply directly in private law but shape it; that is, every provision of private law 
must be interpreted in light of the values and norms that fundamental rights represent.144 
It is argued that the balance of interests contained in private law may be 
disrupted by directly effective human rights because of the great weight customarily 
accorded to fundamental rights in public law. This is because, ordinarily, rights prioritize 
the interest of individuals even if they can be subsequently modified by restrictions 
imposed to achieve legitimate goals and to protect the rights of others. As a result, when 
that strong value attached to rights is transposed to private law it is likely to unsettle 
rules that function to put collective interests ahead of individual rights.145An indirect 
horizontal effect seems superior in this respect for it insists that any claims based on 
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rights should be integrated into the existing carefully considered settlement between 
competing rights in private law which has effectively been tested for generations through 
litigation in the courts and parliamentary debates.146 
Concerns also exist about the impact of the horizontal effect upon the doctrine 
of separation of powers.147Since private law has been developed primarily by the 
legislature, judicial revisions of private law doctrines are regarded as prima facie 
invasions of a sphere properly left to democratic decisions through the legislature. It is 
argued that the democratic legislature has devised a civil code that balances the 
competing interests and rights of private individuals and it is not appropriate for a court 
to adjust that balance by appealing to fundamental rights. For this reason, granting 
direct horizontal effect to constitutional and convention rights can be presented as an 
arrogation of power by the judiciary that undermines democratic 
government.148Ackerman J and Sachs J agree that a direct application of human rights 
would deprive the system of its necessary flexibility and infringe the separation of 
powers principle. They are of the view that an indirect effect of constitutional rights on 
the development of common law would maintain the right of the legislature to shape 
private relationships through the enactment of statutes.149 
Finally, there is a general reluctance for private parties to invoke the Bill of 
Rights directly because constitutional remedies for the private violation of fundamental 
rights are often difficult to envisage or unattractive to litigants. In most cases, common 
law remedies appear to be sufficiently flexible to be considered appropriate for 
horizontal infringement of the Bill of Rights.150 Alternative and more appropriate 
remedies are in any event difficult to imagine for these types of infringements.151 
The preference for an indirect horizontal effect becomes evident when one 
carries out a comparative analysis of the practice in various countries. In South Africa, a 
direct horizontal effect was initially regarded as preferable in terms of legal certainty 
because it rendered unnecessary the difficult distinction between public and private 
action.152 In practice however, the notion of directly enforceable human rights has been 
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rendered practically redundant. The South African Courts have routinely tackled the 
problem of the application of fundamental rights to private relations through the indirect 
application of constitutional values to the common law.153 
Similarly, German jurisprudence adheres to an indirect or ‘radiating effect’ of 
human rights in the private sphere154 The German indirect horizontal effect  seems to 
address the problems of imprecision of  fundamental rights when applied in the private 
sphere as well as the competence of judges to apply broad constitutional norms to 
intricate private disputes by acknowledging the importance of fundamental values while 
at the same time seeking to resolve conflicts primarily through the prism of private 
law.155 
In Ireland, the Irish courts have treated the Constitution as establishing the 
existence of a ‘constitutional tort’ action which can be brought against a private 
individual or organization. Through this tort action, the rights protected under the 
Constitution can be applied directly to regulate the conduct of private actors.156 In 
practice however, the Irish courts will not develop the parameters of an existing tort or 
provide supplemental remedy under their jurisdiction to uphold constitutional rights 
unless the existing scope of the tort in question is basically ineffective or plainly 
inadequate to secure protection of the constitutional rights at issue.157 As a result, the 
impact of the direct horizontal effect doctrine in Ireland has often been muted and even 
nullified by the adoption of a cautious approach by the judiciary towards developing 
private law remedies to reflect rights norms, in particular where existing private law rules 
clearly apply to the matter at issue.158 
Similarly, both the United States and Canada reject direct horizontal effect for 
constitutional rights on grounds that relationships between individuals are better 
regulated by the common law and specific human rights codes.159 
V  Conclusion 
One of the few instances where a direct horizontal application seems to make 
sense is when legislation or common law rules are challenged with the purpose of 
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invalidating them or where the plaintiff cannot find a cause of action in the existing 
common law. An indirect application – that is, the development of the common law – 
seems impossible in such cases. Since the common law does not provide a right, it will 
be necessary to invoke a fundamental right directly.160 
Nonetheless, a comparative analysis of the different approaches to the 
application of fundamental rights to private relations in various jurisdictions reveals that 
most jurisdictions tend to favour an indirect horizontal approach. However, as was 
evident from the cases discussed in chapter 2 of the study, the use of the method of 
indirect horizontal effect may not prevent the risk of the courts making decisions that 
undermine human rights enforcement in the private sphere but it may assist the court in 
recognizing that whilst it is in general important for everyone to respect the dignity of 
others, there is also a value, emphasized strongly in private law, of permitting individuals 
wide scope for unsupervised private autonomy.161 
The findings of this study suggest that an indirect horizontal effect offers the 
best approach to the issue of horizontality in Kenya. This conclusion is reinforced by the 
fact that Article 20(3)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution mandates the application of an 
indirect horizontal effect by requiring the courts to develop the law to the extent that 
such law does not give effect to the fundamental right in question.  I should however 
point out while the methodological logic of indirect horizontal application appears to be 
best suited for engagement with private law, there still remains a limited scope for the 
application of a direct horizontal effect. As Madla J has suggested, the question of direct 
or indirect effect should be reviewed on a case by case basis with a view to the 
particular constitutional right involved.162 
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Horizontality in Kenya: The Proportionality Test and Other Considerations 
 
‘… courts should not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise 
facts to which it is to be applied…’ – Chaskalson J163 
The Kenyan legal system tends to have different perceptions of the role that 
judges should play in giving effect to fundamental rights in private law.164 In this regard, 
the extent to which a judge may apply fundamental rights in private law disputes might 
not be easy to pinpoint.165 Unfortunately, neither the Kenyan Constitution nor Kenyan 
case law offers any guidance on the matter. The result is a general lack of conceptual 
clarity as to when and how fundamental rights should be given horizontal effect in 
Kenya. The objective of this chapter is therefore to consider the various factors that 
should be taken into account when applying fundamental rights in the private sphere. 
The study also examines the adequacy of ‘limitation clauses’ or ‘the proportionality test’ 
as a formula for resolving disputes between private parties in which fundamental rights 
are implicated. 
I Factors to Consider when Applying Fundamental Rights to Private 
Relations 
Unlike the SA Constitution, the Kenyan Constitution does not set out the 
circumstances or conditions under which a fundamental right can be applied 
horizontally. Article 2(1) and 20(1) of the Kenyan Constitution simply states that the 
provisions of the Kenyan Constitution ‘bind all persons’. The only attempt made at 
explaining the meaning of these provisions is found in Article 160 of the Kenyan 
Constitution which defines ‘persons’ to include ‘corporations’ and ‘other unincorporated 
bodies’. However, this does not assist one to know how the courts are expected to apply 
fundamental rights to natural or juristic persons.  
As is evident from the Cradle Case and the Kenyatta Case, the uncertainty as to 
when and how fundamental rights will be given horizontal effect in Kenya continues to 
generate considerable confusion. It could also impact upon contractual autonomy as 
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private individuals and bodies may be unsure or unaware of the constitutional 
obligations that may be imposed on them. Such uncertainty also raises concerns about 
the possibility of ad hoc unstructured judicial law making. 166 It is therefore desirable that 
the Kenyan courts adopt a coherent and consistent method of judicial analysis when 
applying fundamental rights horizontally.167 Given however, the glaring absence of 
Kenyan jurisprudence on the matter, I propose to refer to the more developed 
jurisprudence of South Africa as a guide for the discussion on the matter.  
In South Africa, the determination of the applicability of fundamental rights to 
natural and juristic persons is subject to a special formula contained in section 8(2) of 
the SA Constitution which states that: 
‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic person if and to the 
extent that it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right.’ 
It is contended that this section points to an interpretative process that goes 
beyond the strict construction of the text alone as to whether the right is capable or 
suitable for horizontal application.168 This provision also acknowledges that not every 
right and not all obligations imposed by a particular right are capable of horizontal 
application rather; each right needs to be examined in order to determine whether it can 
be sensibly applied to the private domain. 
Currie & De Waal have argued that the question whether a particular provision 
in the Bill of Rights is horizontally applicable cannot be determined a priori and in the 
abstract.169In other words, the application of fundamental rights to a private party must 
be a context sensitive determination taking into account the appropriateness of imposing 
the particular duty on the particular private party concerned.170They however caution 
that a resort to context or the circumstances of a particular case should not be used to 
frustrate the clear intention of the drafters of the constitution. It is not permissible for 
example to argue that it is only when private persons find themselves in a position 
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comparable to the powerful state that they should be bound to the Bill of Rights.171 As 
we shall see later, this may well be relevant to such an inquiry but is certainly not 
decisive of it. 
A factor that is clearly relevant to a judicial decision on whether to allow for the 
horizontal application of a particular right is the nature and identity of the person or entity 
against whom the right is to be applied. The obvious reason for this is that not everyone 
has an equal capacity to comply with the various obligations imposed by rights.172In the 
context of relations between citizens, (as opposed to a relationship between the state 
and a citizen), the detailed conception of these rights may need to be adjusted to 
accommodate the issues presented in a horizontal relationship.173How a public 
institution should respect a fundamental right may therefore differ considerably from how 
a private body or individual might be expected to respect the same right. Big differences 
might also exist between the obligations imposed on different private bodies to respect 
the same right.174 
For instance, it would be a mistake for a court to simply take the meanings of a 
concept such as freedom of speech or privacy that have been established in disputes 
between the state and citizens and them apply them to the different context of private 
law disputes. The need for translation of concepts occurs because the idea of 
fundamental rights and freedoms differs between the context of public law and private 
law.175As stated in chapter 2 of this study, it is important that the distinctions that exist 
between public and private bodies be taken into account when giving horizontal effect to 
fundamental rights. 
One must also take into account the fact that private persons are primarily 
driven by concern for themselves whereas the state is supposed to be motivated by 
concern for the wellbeing of society as a whole.176In addition, respect for the liberty and 
the privacy of the individual necessitates that private individuals acting in a sphere of 
private activity should not be held to the same standards of probity or correctness in 
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conduct as will be required from state agencies.177Care must therefore be taken to 
ensure that the application of the fundamental rights to private conduct does not 
undermine private autonomy to the same extent that it places restrictions on the 
sovereignty of government.178 
Secondly, the court should consider whether the right is capable of application 
to natural or juristic persons.179The nature of the right might reveal that it is a right 
capable of being applied to private persons such as the right to dignity (injuria, 
defamation), the right to freedom and security of person (tort), the right to privacy, the 
right to an environment that is not harmful to health or wellbeing (nuisance), the right to 
property, and children’s rights. As is evident, most of these rights are already recognized 
in the common law and are therefore illustrative of an imminent horizontality.180 
The common law recognition does not cover the whole ambit of the 
constitutional right but the fact that part of the right is capable of application suggests 
that the right is suitable for application to private persons. In other words, the fact that 
certain of the rights find horizontal expression in the common law and in statute gives a 
clue as to the suitability of a right for horizont l application.181However, Fedtke cautions 
against the dangers of compiling a formal list of rights and duties that can have effect in 
the private sphere and those that cannot. He argues that the circumstances and details 
of the particular case under consideration should always be taken into account.182 
A horizontal application of fundamental rights would therefore need to analyse 
the scope and nature of the right at issue and the extent to which it is capable and 
appropriate to utilize it to alter legal rights and obligations of individuals. Rights that are 
not suitable for being applied to private individuals or bodies within the relevant context 
should be deployed very cautiously, if used to modify existing private law. At the least it 
is imperative that a court engages in an analysis of the content and scope of the right in 
question and not gloss over the issue.183Liebenberg emphasizes that a methodology for 
horizontal application which avoids engagement with the substantive content of the 
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various rights in the Bill of Rights runs the risk of undermining the transformative goals 
of the Constitution.  
Thirdly, if the fundamental right is capable of application to private persons the 
courts must also consider whether it is suitable (in the circumstances of the case) for 
application.184 Accordingly, quite apart from the nature of the right, the nature of the duty 
imposed by the right must be taken into account. In some instances, the duty imposed 
by a right would be particularly onerous on a private person.185 This consideration is of 
particular importance when it comes to the imposition of duties which are likely to have 
financial implications for the parties. The conduct of private parties has to be funded 
from their own pockets and for this reason the same duties imposed on an organ of 
state which relies on public funds may not be imposed on them.186 Such an issue arose 
in the Cradle Case where the respondent, Nation Media argued that the fulfilment of the 
rights sought by Cradle requiring that Nation Media install a sign language inset or sub-
titles in all its newscasts would be financially onerous to Nation Media. Responding to 
this argument, the judge in the Cradle Case stated that; 
‘…While the Court appreciates that costs will go with compliance with the 
requirement of the law, it is my humble view that such costs should not be an 
inhibition or restriction on the court to play its rightful role in the advancement 
and protection of the rights of marginalized communities within our society. The 
point I am making is that money cannot be a substitute to the enjoyment of the 
rights bestowed constitutionally and statutorily to persons with hearing 
disability… the Respondent and other television broadcasters have no option 
but to comply.’187 
It is doubtful that the approach adopted by the judge in the Cradle Case would 
be appropriate for all cases concerning a horizontal enforcement of fundamental rights 
although in the particular circumstances of the Cradle Case the judges’ conclusion 
appears to be sound. It would be incorrect to dismiss the financial impact of a horizontal 
enforcement of fundamental rights in the manner suggested in the Cradle Case. 
Perhaps a better approach would have been for the judge to conduct an analysis of the 
nature of the duty sought to be imposed on Nation Media and consider whether having 
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had due regard to the circumstance of the case and the importance of the right, the 
need for Nation Media to fulfil the duty imposed by the right in question outweighed the 
attendant financial implications. 
Fourthly, it has been suggested that the extent to which a private entity may be 
held accountable for infringements of fundamental rights must depend on the nature and 
extent of the power exercised by the entity, the degree to which the poser emulates 
state powers and the impact of the power on the enjoyment of the right.188The case of 
Khumalo vs.Homolisa (“Khumalo”)189 is significant in this regard. O’Regan J is quoted as 
stating that: 
“Given the intensity of the constitutional right in question, coupled with the 
potential invasion of that right which could be occasioned by persons other than 
the state or state organs … it is clear that the right to freedom of expression is 
of direct horizontal application in this case as contemplated in section 8(2) of the 
Constitution.”190 
Liebenberg has argued that the above findings of O’Regan J suggest that the 
application of any right in the Bill of Rights to a private party should depend on the 
power of the private party concerned to undermine the interests and values protected by 
the particular right.191 
Fifthly, the objective of a fundamental right and the interest that it seeks to 
protect is also an important consideration in determining whether the right is applicable 
to private conduct or not. For instance the purpose of the right to reside anywhere in the 
country in South Africa is aimed at preventing the state from introducing legislation that 
divides the country into racial zones. It follows that this right is strictly speaking, not 
intended to have a general horizontal application.192 
Other factors that the court should take into account when applying fundamental 
rights to private relations is the fact that the infringement (or danger) must be substantial 
and affect a right of sufficient importance, and there must also be a high probability that 
the individual will actually suffer damage.193Finally the court should also consider the 
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scope of existing legislation in the given area as well as competing rights of other private 
parties.194 These latter considerations are examined in greater detail in the next section 
of this chapter. 
II ‘Balancing Rights’ and the (In)adequacy of the Proportionality Test 
It has been argued that application of limitation clauses which regulate the 
manner in which certain fundamental rights may be restricted in disputes between the 
state and a citizen may be difficult to transplant disputes between private parties.195 This 
section of the study attempts to evaluate the cogency of this assertion. 
Vertical constitutional disputes pit individual rights against the state, while 
horizontal constitutional disputes pit rights against one another.196While the state can 
under no circumstances invoke human rights protection, the opposite is true in the case 
of its counterpart in horizontal disputes between stronger and weaker private entities. 
Both sides to a private legal conflict (be they employers and employees, companies and 
customers, landlords and tenants, or reporting media and the objects of its interest) can 
invoke the protection of human rights.197 
In many horizontal disputes, what is at stake in the first stage of the analysis is 
not simply whether a right has been violated; the important question to be answered is 
which party’s right should prevail.198 A court will therefore have to figure out a way to 
rank these rights, that is, it must come up with a method whereby one right can be 
preferred over another. Unfortunately, no persuasive method for ranking rights is to be 
found in the text of the Kenyan Constitution. The fact that it recognizes certain national 
values as being fundamental does not tell us whether, for instance, the right to liberty 
should prevail over the right to equality.199In fact, Article 10(2) (b) of the Kenyan 
Constitution simply recognizes all fundamental rights as a constitutional value, thereby 
implying that all fundamental rights are of equal importance.200 
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In public law, many fundamental rights can be qualified or modified on grounds 
of public policy according to some version of a test of proportionality. The test of 
proportionality can be formulated in slightly different ways but its focus is on the issue of 
whether the policy reason for an interference with a protected fundamental right is of 
sufficient strength to justify the interference.201To balance these interests against each 
other is far from straightforward. In truth, the test of proportionality provides a useful 
structure for a legal analysis of the justifiability of interferences by the state with 
fundamental rights but ultimately it requires a court to engage in a difficult balancing 
exercise between incommensurable values.202 
In the context of private law, contractual disputes will always have competing 
rights, values and policy considerations that are at stake. The courts therefore have an 
exacting task of balancing and attempting to achieve an optimal reconciliation of these 
values and rights.203 It is argued that the existence of rights and policy considerations on 
both sides of the argument prevents the application of the familiar test of proportionality 
because this transplant will not function to provide a procedure by which all the different 
relevant considerations are measured against each other.204 
According to Fedtke, whereas state intervention in human rights protection must 
undoubtedly adhere to the strict requirements of proportionality, this is not the case 
where the legislator is not restricting rights for the sake of the public will but rather 
identifying conflicting private interests and balancing these in the light of constitutional 
values when enacting rules of private law.205In the absence therefore, of a clear 
workable criteria for dealing with competing fundamental rights in private disputes, the 
matter solely depends on the subjective view of judges. As a consequence there is a 
danger of arbitrary choices between fundamental rights being made by judges guided 
primarily by their own views.206 It has therefore been argued that in order to find the right 
balance between conflicting positions of individuals in horizontal relationships; the 
traditional concepts applied to the limitation of constitutional rights including the principle 
of proportionality would at the very least require substantial modification.207 
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If the test of proportionality developed in public law is inappropriate in those 
cases where both parties to a private law dispute are protesting about an interference 
with their rights what is the correct formulation of the test? One school of thought 
proposes that since the case is a contest between two rights, a court ought to determine 
whether the interference with the former is justifiable by reference to the latter.208 Thus, 
decisions by the stronger party are subjected to a proportionality test.209 
However, there is a second school of thought that proposes the adoption of a 
‘double proportionality test’. This test proposes that the separate rights of each party 
need to be assessed separately according to a test of proportionality.210For example, in 
a case concerning a clash of the right to freedom of expression and the right to 
protection of a persons’ privacy under Article 8 and 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, Lord Steyn explained this approach in the following manner: 
“First, neither Article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where 
the values under the two Articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the 
comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual 
case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting 
each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be 
applied to each. For convenience, I will call this the ultimate balancing test.211 
I need not provide an illustration of the application of the ‘double proportionality test’ for 
the reader to appreciate just how challenging and complex an exercise it can be. 
III  Indirect Horizontal Effect as a Solution to the ‘Balancing’ Problem 
A dispute between private parties may be determined both on the level of 
contracts and on the level of fundamental rights. At the level of fundamental rights, the 
question to be answered, both at a substantive and procedural level is which 
fundamental right ultimately prevails. In contrast, on the level of private law, in this case, 
contract law, the question to be answered in such a debate is whether on the one hand 
a particularly risky transaction is prohibited or prevented in practice from occurring or 
whether on the other hand, the conclusions of the transaction should be allowed 
provided that the stronger party has taken reasonable steps to explain the inherent risk 
of the transaction to the weaker party so that the weaker party’s consent can be 
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presumed not to have been vitiated as a result of mistake, fraud or undue influence.212 
In both cases, the question of whether an infringement amounts to liability seems to boil 
down to a balance of the parties interests. In the case of an indirect effect approach, the 
balance takes place within the framework of the rules of private law whereas in the case 
of direct effect approach a balance has to be struck between the parties opposing 
fundamental rights213 
A number of legal critics have expressed their disapproval with the idea of 
‘balancing’ fundamental rights as a way of resolving disputes concerning fundamental 
between private parties. Cherednychenko is opposed to an approach that seeks to 
resolve a dispute between private parties at a constitutional level and argues that private 
law courts should not complicate legal discourse by resorting to fundamental rights 
arguments in cases where the values enshrined in fundamental rights are already 
recognized by private law.214 
Similarly, Cheadle Haysom& D Davis, argue that the conduct of a person is 
always tested against a statutory or common law rule and only rules (rather than 
conduct) should be the subject of a constitutional inquiry. They further argue that the Bill 
of Rights only reaches into the exercise of private power through ordinary legislation or 
the medium of a common law rule.215They are of the view that it is more appropriate that 
competing claims arising from the overlap of rights be resolved by law rather than by an 
abstract balancing of rights to determine common and impermeable boundaries.216 
What Cheadle, Davis & Haysom and Cherednychenko appear to be expressing 
is a preference for an indirect horizontal effect as a method of resolving disputes 
concerning fundamental rights between private parties. In other words, rather than 
relying on their own subjective judgment to resolve conflicting constitutional rights, 
judges may rely on ordinary legislations and common law to carry out this balancing 
exercise because they address problems of conflicting rights and interests through a 
system of balancing. Indeed, English jurisprudence appears to have deliberately 
avoided the question of balancing fundamental rights and have for the most part 
confined the balance of parties’ interests within the sphere of private law even where 
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fundamental rights are implicated.217Similarly, in the case of McDonnell vs. Ireland, 
Barrington J stated that: 
‘The general problem of resolving how constitutional rights are to be balanced 
against each other and reconciled with the exigencies of the common good is in 
the first instance a matter for the legislature. It is only when the legislature has 
failed in its constitutional duty to defend or vindicate a particular right that this 
court will feel obliged to fashion its own remedy. If however a practical method 
of defending or vindicating the right already exist at common law or by statute, 
there will be no need for this court to intervene…constitutional rights should not 
be regarded as wild cards which can be played at any time to defeat all existing 
rules.’218 
Indeed, an analysis of the Cradle Case reveals that that section 39 of the Persons with 
Disabilities Act had already addressed the question of whether Nation Media was 
obliged to provide inset sign language broadcast or subtitles for its newscasts. It is 
therefore arguable that the judge’s attempt to balance the competing fundamental rights 
asserted by the parties was wholly unnecess ry as the relevant statute had already 
struck the balance for her. The fact that both parties chose to invoke fundamental rights 
was in my view, immaterial. 
However, not all private law disputes involving a conflict of fundamental rights 
will be capable of being resolved through common law or legislation. There will be cases 
when common law or ordinary legislation will be inconsistent with constitutional norms 
and values or inadequate or altogether non-existent. In such cases, the court should be 
free to decide to what extent the right in question should have an impact on private 
relations.219 It is however, hoped that with the adoption of the indirect horizontal effect, 
cases in which judges will be required to engage in a complex exercise of ‘balancing’ 
fundamental rights will be the exception rather than the norm. 
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The Way Forward: Challenges and Recommendations 
 
‘..Legislation and common law are the primary vehicles for giving effect to the horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights…’– Professor Sandra Liebenberg220 
This chapter seeks to highlight some of the challenges that the Kenyan courts 
are likely to encounter when applying fundamental rights to private relations. The study 
does not purport to provide solutions to these problems; that is clearly beyond its scope. 
Rather, the objective is to create a certain level of awareness in order to provoke 
debates and discussions within Kenya’s legal circles on how these issues may be 
resolved. 
While the application of fundamental rights to private relations may be affected 
by a wide range of difficulties; this chapter only seeks to address two .i.e. contractual 
waiver, and legal culture. The study makes various recommendations and proposals for 
reform in respect of the application of fundamental rights in the private sphere in Kenya. 
It concludes by making a case for the need for Parliament to formulate legislation aimed 
at giving effect to fundamental rights as a solution to the difficulties that bedevil the 
notion of horizontality in Kenya. 
I Contractual Waiver 
In public law, it is usually no defence for a state to allege that an interference 
with a right was justifiable on the ground that the individual concerned had consented to 
the interference. The state must defend its interferences with rights according to a strict 
test of proportionality under which it must demonstrate that it has a legitimate aim and 
has acted appropriately and only where necessary.221 
In contrast, in the private sphere, it is normal for fundamental rights to be 
sacrificed by agreement.222 While there are limits to the power of individuals to consent 
to the abrogation of rights such as the invalidity of a contract of slavery, these outer 
boundaries leave a wide range of choices for the exercise of individual discretion to 
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qualify or forfeit individual rights.223For example, alienation of property and therefore the 
loss of property rights is usually achieved through a consensual transaction. Similarly, 
the right to keep information private under the right to respect for private life can be lost 
by agreement where an author agrees to publish memoirs about his or her scurrilous 
life.224 
The possibility for parties to agree on a contractual waiver of an interest 
protected by fundamental rights therefore forms a specific example of the way a balance 
may be struck between freedom of contract and fundamental rights.225The important 
question then becomes to what extent should the courts enforce fundamental rights in a 
private law context in order to protect the individual against him or herself? 
In principle, many of the freedom rights may be waived as long as the subject 
does so clearly and freely and without being placed under duress or labouring under a 
misapprehension. The effect of such a waiver firstly depends on the nature and purpose 
of the fundamental right in question. This means that in order for a waiver to be 
enforceable, there would have to be a fully informed consent showing that the applicant 
was aware of the exact nature and extent to the rights being waived in consequence of 
such consent.226 
According to Cherednychenko, in the absence of specific legislation of a 
mandatory character containing specific rules, implementing these rights into horizontal 
relationships between private parties, private law courts should be free to decide the 
extent that these rights are to have an impact on contract law. In this regard, she argues 
that it may be possible to enforce a contract which obliges the employee to work more 
than forty hours per week on the basis of contract law subject to the condition that the 
employee had freely contracted away his right to a limitation on maximum working 
hours.227 
A study of the practice in Germany reveals that courts have drawn a distinction 
between rules of private law which parties are free to adopt, change or ignore when 
establishing contractual relationships and rules which are enforced regardless of the 
parties’ intentions. Ordinarily, the effect of human rights considerations will be most 
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intensive in the case of (but not restricted to) those rules of private law which are 
deemed so important for the protection of the general interest that they are not left to the 
disposition of private parties.228 
For instance, the German courts have given direct effect to the right to marry in 
a judgment concerning a student nurse whose training contract stipulated that she would 
be laid off if she marries (a so called celibacy clause’ or non-marriage clause). Similarly, 
the Cour D’Appel of Paris has held that the stipulation that Air France stewardesses 
must remain unmarried was void as the freedom to marry could not in principle be 
contractually limited or waived.229However, the fact that some rights may not be waived 
does not mean that the fact of waiver then becomes legally irrelevant. Waiver may be 
relevant when considering the remedy to be awarded for the violation of the fundamental 
right.230 
Further, courts will not enforce contracts in which the parties have undertaken to 
behave unconstitutionally. Two people cannot undertake for example, that the law of 
defamation must be applied in future disputes between them without any reference to 
the Bill of Rights. The reason for this is that the constitution requires courts to promote 
the Bill of Rights when developing common law and individuals may not prevent the 
courts from fulfilling its constitutional obligations.231What individuals may do is waive the 
right to exercise a fundamental right. For instance, an individual may undertake not to 
exercise the invalidity of state or private conduct. From a constitutional point of view 
however, such waiver is seldom decisive of an issue.232 
In the case of Wittman vs. Deustscher Schulverrein, Pretoria, the Court found 
that the applicant had waived her constitutional right to freedom of religion by subjecting 
herself and her daughter to a private school’s constitution and regulations.233Currie & De 
Waal support this decision particularly because of the fact that that there was nothing to 
prevent the applicant from enrolling in a school where there was no religious instruction 
for a certain period of time or to leave the school.234 
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In summary therefore, when dealing with a case of contractual waiver of 
fundamental rights, the recommended approach is for the court to; a) establish the 
fundamental right at stake and how it interacts with freedom of contract and b) carry out 
a balance of interests based on the extent to which the ‘weaker‘ party has been able to 
freely determine its contractual position. Courts may ultimately declare null and void or 
leave without effect a contract clause that excessively limits the weaker party’s 
fundamental right.235 
Finally, it has also been recommended that the court adopt an indirect 
horizontal approach in the case of a contractual waiver. It is argued that permitting 
directly effective human rights to determine the outcome of private law disputes will 
ignore the traditional and liberal respect paid to informed consent. On the other hand, 
the method of indirect horizontal effect will not avoid this risk but it may force the court to 
explain more carefully why it proposes to ignore the consensual nature of the activity 
just because it regards it as undignified, distasteful or perverse.236 
II Legal Culture, Constitutional Tradition & Other Constraints 
Although Kenya has a common law tradition, it is in some aspects similar to the 
continental systems in the sense that it instinctively places a lot of emphasis on the 
legislator as the most legitimate source of law (while accepting that many including 
constitutional development are in fact strongly affected and sometimes driven by 
judges).237 
Therefore, unlike his or her South African counterpart, a Kenyan judge will not 
be easily persuaded to ‘create law’ by means of developing the common law. There is 
also no legal culture of ‘reading in’ or ‘reading down’ statutes in Kenya. Nor do the 
judiciary go so far as to order the legislature to amend certain laws within prescribed 
time lines failing which such provision would stand invalid. Rather, one is likely to come 
across statements to the effect that; ‘until Parliament deems it fit to amend’ the 
impugned law the judge’s ‘hands are tied.’ 
This does not mean that Kenyan judges do not strike down legislation that is 
proven to be unconstitutional; they do so regularly. What they will not do, however, is to 
go a step further and spell out the court’s version of a constitutionally acceptable 
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approach with which the legislature would have to comply and set time limits for 
Parliament to amend the law.238 This understanding regarding the respective roles of the 
judiciary and the legislature is a reflection of Kenya’s legal culture and constitutional 
tradition which continue to influence the extent to which judges are ready to invoke 
fundamental rights to develop various spheres of private law.239 
According to Froneman J, the conventional wisdom of deferring to legislative 
choices to avoid considering whether long standing private law rules require significant 
reform (in order to conform to constitutional norms and values) prevents courts from 
doing their bit in eradicating distorting patterns of interpersonal, social and economic 
domination. He argues that this type of ‘judicial minimalism’ in areas regulated by private 
law will tend to assist only a transfer of power between elites not the substantive 
transformation of the character of our society as the best reading of the constitution 
requires.240 
Similarly, Klare argues that legal culture and socialization constrain legal 
outcomes irrespective of the substantive mandates entrenched in constitutions and 
legislation.241 He describes legal culture to mean professional sensibilities, habits of 
mind and intellectual reflexes.242He further states that legal culture has a powerful 
filtering effect on interpretative practices and therefore on adjudication and substantive 
legal development. He is of the view that the unconscious and unreflective reliance on 
the culturally available intellectual tools and instincts handed down from earlier times 
may exercise a drag on constitutional interpretation weighing down and limiting its 
ambition and achievements in democratic transformation.243 
The continued reluctance of Kenyan judges to infuse constitutional norms and 
values into private contractual disputes is therefore not only inconsistent with the aims 
and objectives of the Kenyan Constitution but is also retrogressive. With particular 
reference to the court’s attitude towards the doctrine of freedom of contract, Pound 
observed that: 
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“The attitude of many of our courts on the subject of liberty of contract is so 
certain to be misapprehended, is so out of the range of ordinary understanding, 
the decisions themselves are so academic and so artificial…” 
Another major factor that has been said to constrain the development of the role 
of fundamental rights in the private sphere is the legal culture of privileging negative 
rights and liberties. Kenya’s private law, like that of South Africa, provides strong 
protection to vested property rights and the negative freedom to contract freely without 
undue judicial intervention.244Indeed, it is not unusual to come across a decision where 
a Kenyan judge reaffirms that ‘it is not the place of the courts to re-write a contract for 
the parties’.245This means that traditional notions of sanctity of contract and judicial 
restraint are likely to prevail over any transformation of existing doctrines inspired by 
fundamental rights and their underlying purpose and values.246 
Liebenberg argues that the privileging of negative rights and liberty in 
constitutional adjudication is not merely a question of the methodology of applying the 
constitution to private law but a substantive ideological choice.247 She is of the view that 
these trends will continue unless the classic liberal ideology of minimizing state and 
judicial interference in private relationships in our legal culture is loosened.248With 
particular regard to the horizontal enforcement of socio economic rights, Liebenberg 
correctly points out that socio-economic rights did not originally form part of private law 
tradition and the constitutional recognition of socio-economic rights require a 
fundamental transformation of private law to give proper effect these rights. She 
therefore argues that the horizontal application of socio-economic rights requires a 
radical break with conventional patterns of thought about the way in which the law 
should regulate relationships between non-state actors.249 
The concept of horizontality in a constitution seeks to irradiate democratic 
norms and values into the so called private sphere, particularly the market, the 
workplace and the family.250 It is evident that legal culture plays a major role on whether 
this objective will be achieved. In order for fundamental rights to play any meaningful 
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role in the private sphere, there will be a need for judges to shift their intellectual focus 
from a highly structured, technist, and rule bound approach to adjudication to a more 
policy based and consequentialist approach.251 
III Enabling Legislation 
Whilst it is not doubted that the state has a positive constitutional duty to 
intervene in certain private relationships for the benefit of a particular party, the point to 
be made is that the focus of such intervention ought to be on legislation designed and 
necessary to give effect to constitutional values.252The most fundamental value of the 
constitution – popular sovereignty – requires that an individual’s rights must be protected 
against private violation is in the first instance through legislation. It is the legislatures’ 
task to enact legislation to vindicate the rights of all persons by balancing the rights of 
groups and individuals with competing interests.253 
Article 21(1) of the Kenyan Constitution imposes a duty on the state and state 
organs to ‘observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the fundamental rights in the Bill 
of Rights. It has been argued that the duty to ‘protect’ places an obligation on the state 
to enact and enforce necessary legislation to regulate and enable private actors fulfil 
their duties with regard to fundamental rights. Indeed some provisions of the constitution 
expressly require the state to enact legislation to give effect to certain fundamental 
rights.254 
The legislator would thus be obliged to create a system of private law which 
balances competing private interests and ensures that individual freedom is adequately 
protected in private relationships.255 Springman & Osborne have argued that courts 
have no business deciding which right ought to be preferred to another and recommend 
that this balancing exercise be left to the legislature which has the democratic legitimacy 
to decide such matters because it is in the legislature that such choices will be subject to 
exhaustive investigation, committee deliberation, publicity, debate, negotiation and if 
necessary, amendment by ordinary procedures. They further argue that it is these 
characteristics of the legislative process that bestow upon legislative value choices a 
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democratic legitimacy that can never be yielded by judicial value selection.256 Similarly, 
Cheadle & Davis observe that: 
“Legitimate concerns about private power aside; we should not shy away from 
the dangers and the difficulties that s 8(2) and (3) raise. It appears to hand to an 
unelected elite the power to develop rules to govern the conduct of citizens – a 
power that in any conception of democracy is the preserve of the democratically 
elected legislature. It is then a provision that on the face of it is at odds with the 
deepest commitments of our constitution. It seems to reflect a distrust of the 
legislature and a muddling function.” 
In summary, the balancing of constitutional rights against individual common 
law freedom is more appropriately done in legislation than by judicial decision. This is 
because relationships between individuals are better regulated by the common law and 
specific human rights codes.”257Where adequate and effective regulatory legislation 
exists, litigants will be required to rely on such legislation to protect their rights against 
infringement by private parties. The advantages of this is that a) it avoids a tendency of 
judges to create law and as a result breach of the separation of powers doctrine, b) the 
application of the Bill of Rights will be more precisely expressed in statute and c)  it will 
eliminate the uncertainty that is associated with broad constitutional provisions.258 
In determining whether to require reliance on legislative measures for giving 
effect to the horizontal application of fundamental rights, courts must however, be 
cognizant to the very real limitations and constraints of legislatures in ensuring effective 
protection of constitutional rights. Modern legislatures are subject to the constraints of 
time and resource pressures, they are at a relative disadvantage to the executive in 
relation to technical expertise and resources and subject to the capture of powerful 
business and interest groups in society. This situation results in imperfect legislation 
which may disregard or neglect the rights of particular groups frequently those who are 
politically, economically and socially marginalized. In such cases, litigants must still look 
to the courts to find a remedy in terms of the existing common law or where necessary, 
to develop new common laws remedy to give effect to the relevant constitutional 
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right.259In other words, where the state has failed to provide any protection at all or if the 
measures taken were clearly insufficient the court has a duty to intervene.260 
Finally, while  there is no doubt that the indirect horizontal effect can provide 
protection in many situations, experience has also shown that the approach will need to 
be bolstered by the enactment of specific statutes designed to safeguard constitutional 
values in the private sphere. The indirect constitutional route is, on its own, simply not 
effective enough.261 
IV   Conclusion - Are we Back Where we Started? 
When I retrace my steps to the beginning of this discussion in chapter 1 and 2 
of this study, I cannot help but to wonder whether having ‘gone full circle’, ‘we are back 
where we started’; that is to  say, we are back to the traditional view that only recognizes 
the vertical application of fundamental rights. Upon further reflection however, I find that 
this is perhaps a one dimensional assessment of the matter.   
There is no doubt that Kenyan Constitution, offers protections that go well 
beyond the vertical application of fundamental rights. Indeed, the study makes it clear 
that traditional barriers to the application of fundamental rights in the private sphere such 
as the private/public law divide or the notion of an unlimited doctrine of freedom of 
contract no longer hold sway and are out of step with the realities of modern day 
commercial transactions.  
However, Article 20(1) (a) of the Kenyan Constitution requires that a horizontal 
application of the fundamental rights take place indirectly; that is, within the limits of 
common law rules and ordinary legislation tailored specifically to give effect to the 
various rights. Further, legal critics have discouraged the practice of attempting to 
resolve disputes by ‘balancing’ various the rights that come into conflict when applied to 
private relations. Instead, they recommend that this analysis be carried out through the 
medium of ordinary legislation and common law. Comparative studies support this 
approach and there is really no reason why Kenya should depart from it. 
Whereas the study appreciates the importance of contractual autonomy in 
private relations, it requires courts to engage in a deeper analysis of such relationships 
in order to establish whether they represent a genuine equality of bargaining power, as 
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opposed to a merely formal equality. In the event that it is determined that a transaction 
does not represent a genuine equality of bargaining power, the court should consider 
whether such a case warrants the intervention of fundamental rights so as to protect the 
interests of a weaker party. It is contended that such an approach would enable courts 
to strike a balance between the need to protect fundamental rights on the one hand and 
the need to protect the contractual autonomy of private persons on the other. 
Further, in view of the existing confusion and apparent lack of conceptual clarity 
on the question of horizontality in Kenya, the study attempts to propose a methodology 
of judicial analysis that may be useful in understanding when and how fundamental 
rights should be applied to private relations. This analysis involves a consideration of the 
nature of the right in question, the duty imposed by the right, the identity of the party 
against whom it is sought to impose the duty and whether the parties have a special 
relationship in which one of them would ordinarily have significant control among other 
factors. The difficulties posed by the horizontal application of fundamental rights such as 
contractual waiver and an inflexible legal culture and constitutional tradition are identified 
and left open for further discussion and analysis.  
The study concludes that whilst an indirect horizontal approach appears to offer 
the most appropriate method of applying fundamental rights in the private sphere in 
Kenya, it is an insufficient mechanism for ensuring the infusion of constitutional norms 
and values in the private sphere. More would be required in the form of legislation 
specifically aimed to give effect to the various fundamental rights. In the context of the 
law of contract, legislation such as the Consumer Protection Act and the Employment 
Act are of particular significance. 
 An indirect horizontal approach that is complemented by legislation specifically 
aimed at giving effect to fundamental rights may well prevent us from ‘going back where 


















Afrox Health Care Bpk vs. Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
Barkhuizen vs. Napier (‘Barkhuizen’) CCT72/05 [2007] ZACC 5. 
Brisley vs. Drotsky 432/2000 [2002] ZASCA 35. 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 938 
Cradle (The Children Foundation) suing as trustee through Geoffrey Maganya vs. Nation 
Media Group Limited, High Court JR. Misc. App. No. 217 of 2011. 
Du Plessis vs. De Klerk1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Limited v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited [2011] ZACC 30. 
Hoffman v South Africa Airways2000 (CCT17/00) [2000] ZACC 17 
Kenyatta vs. Nairobi Star Publications Limited High Court Petition No. 187 of 2012. 
Kenya Bus Service Limited v The Attorney General Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous 
Application No. 13 of 2005 (Unreported). 
Kenya Revenue Authority vs. Menginya Salim Murangui H.C.C.C No. 1139 of 2002 [2010] 
eKlr. 
Khumalo vs. Homolisa CCT53/01 [2002] ZACC 12. 
Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Limited 2012 (5) BCLR 449 (CC). 
Mwangi Stephen Mureithi vs. Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi Petition Number 625 of 2009 [2011] 
eKLR. 
RM vs. Attorney General of Kenya, High Court of Kenya Civil Case No. 1351 of 2002 
Teitiwnnang and Ariong& Others [1987] L.R.C. Const. 517. 
Vernon v Bethel, 2 Eden 110. 
Zantsi vs. Council of State, Ciskei & Others (CCT24/94) [1995] ZACC 1. 
 
Statutes 
The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (2010). 
The Constitution of Kenya Review Act No. 9 of 2008. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (1963) (Repealed). 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
Books 












Barendt ‘The United States and Canada: State Action, Constitutional Rights and Private 
Actors’ in Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study. 
Cheadle, Davis &Haysom in South African Constitutional Law: the Bill of Rights. 
Cherednychenko, ‘Subordinating Contract Law to Fundamental Rights: Towards a Major 
Breakthrough or Towards Walking in Circles?’ in Constitutional Values & European Contract 
Law (2008). 
Currie & De Waal The New Constitutional & Administrative Law 
Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005). 
Fedtke ‘Drittwirkung in Germany’ in Human Rights and the Private Sphere: A Comparative 
Study. 
Hager, ‘Fundamental Rights in National (Namely) German Contract Law’ in Constitutional 
Values & European Contract Law’(2008). 
Hunter-Hein ‘Horizontal Application and the Triumph of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ in Human Rights & the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study. 
Le Roux,Van Marle Ten Years after AZAPO vs. The President of South Africa. 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution. 
Mak ‘Interactions between Contract Law and Fundamental Rights’ in Fundamental Rights in 
European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual 
Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, England. 
O’Cinniede ‘Irish Constitutional Law and Direct Horizontal Effect – A Successful Experiment’ in 
Human Rights & the Private Sphere: A Comparative Study. 
 
Journals 
Bhana, Pieterse ‘Toward a Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley 
and Afrox Revisited’ SAHRLJ (2005) 876. 
Cheadle, Davis ‘The Application of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere’ (1997) SALJ 
57. 
Cockrell ‘Can You Paradigm? – Another Perspective on the Public Law/Private Law Divide’ 
(1993) Acta Juridica 227. 
Chirwa ‘The Horizontal Application of Constitutional Rights in a Comparative Perspective’ 
available at http:// www.saflii.org/za/journals/LDD/2006/9.pdf. 
Collins ‘On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law’ in LSE Law 
Society & Economy Working Papers 7/2012. 












Knox ‘Horizontal Human Rights Law’ available at http:// www.asil.org/pdfs/ajil_horizontal_ 
human _rights_law.pdf. 
Oduor ‘Inconsistent Judgments in the Kenyan High Court’ available at 
http://www.academia.edu/ 3530104 /Inconsistent _judgments_ in_the_Kenyan_High_Court. 
Pieterse ‘Indirect Horizontal Application of the Right to Have Access to Health Care Services’ 
(2207) 23 SALJ 161. 
Pound ‘Liberty of Contract’ Volume 18 of the Yale LJ 17. 
Springman, Osborne ‘Du Plessis is not Dead: South Africa’s 1996 Constitution and the 
Application of the Bill of Rights to Private Disputes’ (1999) SALJ 42. 
 
 
 
 
